Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 47
Number 2 SUPREME COURT—OCTOBER TERM
2012

Article 3

October 2014

"Amorphous Federalism" And The Supreme Court's Marriage
Cases
David B. Cruz
University of Southern California Gould School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David B. Cruz, "Amorphous Federalism" And The Supreme Court's Marriage Cases, 47 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 393
(2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol47/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

"Amorphous Federalism" And The Supreme Court's Marriage Cases
Cover Page Footnote
Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. I thank Nancy Marcus and Doug
NeJaime for thoughtful comments on the Article, John Korevec for valuable research assistance, and the
editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their professional editorial work. Any remaining
errors are my responsibility.

This article is available in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol47/iss2/3

AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM

9/30/2014 4:43 PM

“AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM” AND THE
SUPREME COURT’S MARRIAGE CASES*
David B. Cruz**
This Article addresses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in
Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor, the two cases in
the October 2012 Term that took up issues of marriage rights of samesex couples. After Part I of the Article provides a brief Introduction,
Part II examines the Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry. It summarizes
the litigation; teases out divergent views of the relevance of federalism
for the Court’s standing ruling in the case; identifies the problematic
constitutional underpinnings of the Perry dissenters’ views of federal
court standing, which rely on an unjustified constitutional privileging of
initiative lawmaking; and explains why Perry is likely to have but
limited impact on the Supreme Court’s Article III standing doctrine.
Part III then summarizes the Windsor litigation; defends what should
have been the self-evident conclusion—though denied by Justice Scalia
in his dissent—that the majority opinion is based on equal protection
(even if it perhaps also rests on substantive due process protection of
“liberty”) and in so doing unpacks its treatment of federalism—
something Scalia derided as “amorphous”—to show how the majority’s
treatment of states’ predominant historical role in marriage regulation
fits within an evidentiary framework the Court used to help establish
the impropriety of the purpose of the Defense of Marriage Act; and
explores some potential ramifications of the Windsor decision for
challenges to state refusals to recognize same-sex couples’ marriages
from other states and to state refusals to allow same-sex couples to
marry within their territory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2013, one decade to the day after the Supreme
Court of the United States decided its landmark “gay rights” case
Lawrence v. Texas,1 the Court decided a pair of cases concerning
whether the Constitution guarantees same-sex couples rights to civil
marriages equal to those of different-sex couples. Hollingsworth v.
Perry2 presented equal protection and substantive due process
challenges to California’s Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”), which amended
the state constitution to strip same-sex couples of the right to marry
that the state supreme court had previously held the constitution
guaranteed. United States v. Windsor3 presented an equal protection
challenge to section 3 of the federal so-called Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA),4 which defines marriage for virtually all federal law as
limited to male-female couples,5 thus excluding same-sex couples
lawfully married under state, Indian tribal, or foreign law from
federal legal rights and responsibilities conditioned upon marriage.
In Perry,6 the governor and the attorney general of California
had refused to defend Prop 8,7 which was instead defended by the
individual sponsors or “proponents” of the initiative. When
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that Texas’s “homosexual conduct” law unconstitutionally
deprived the men who challenged the law of liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
3. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). By way of disclosure, I was a member of the board of directors
during much of and an elected general counsel for the ACLU throughout the Windsor litigation,
and the ACLU represented Edie Windsor in her challenge to DOMA section 3, although I did not
help with that litigation.
4. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (2006)).
5. Section 3 of DOMA defines “marriage” for most federal law purposes to “mean[ ] only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ [to]
refer[ ] only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” Id. § 3.
6. I depart here from the convention of referring to cases by the first (nongovernmental)
party named in the caption to honor Kris Perry, along with her now wife Sandy Stier, and their
coplaintiffs Jeff Zarillo and Paul Katami, also now married, whose bravery (and perhaps
incaution) in litigating against California’s Proposition 8 led to the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional
decision in Perry clearing the way for same-sex couples to resume marrying in the state. I do not
see any need to honor Dennis Hollingsworth, one of the official proponents of Proposition 8 who
qualified that odious measure for the ballot and subsequently doggedly tried to ensure its
discrimination would continue.
7. Bob Egelko, Same-Sex Marriage Fuels Debate over Path to Change, SFGATE (Sept. 8,
2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Same-sex-marriage-fuels-debate-over-path
-to-change-4797401.php#page-2.
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Proposition 8 was held unconstitutional following a bench trial,8 the
state defendants refused to appeal, leaving the proponents to attempt
to do so themselves. When the U.S. Supreme Court granted their
petition for a writ of certiorari, it directed the parties not simply to
address whether Proposition 8 was unconstitutional but also to brief
whether the proponents had standing.9 After arguments in March
2013, a majority of the Court ruled that the measure’s proponents
lacked Article III standing,10 dismissed the appeal,11 and ultimately
left the district court injunction against Proposition 8 intact,12
clearing the way for same-sex couples to resume marrying in
California.
Windsor also presented standing issues, because after Edie
Windsor filed the lawsuit, Attorney General Eric Holder and
President Barack Obama concluded that section 3 of DOMA was
unconstitutional and therefore refused to defend it.13 The House
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) then intervened to defend
it.14 Although BLAG lost on summary judgment, where the district
judge vindicated the administration’s position,15 the Department of
Justice (DOJ) did not comply with the judgment but instead sought
to appeal the case, as did BLAG.16 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with the district court that DOMA’s section 3 was
unconstitutional,17 and DOJ and BLAG sought Supreme Court
review. Answering a question it had directed the parties to address,18
the Supreme Court ruled in Windsor that there was a proper case or
8. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
9. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786, 786 (2012) (“In addition to the question
presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question:
Whether petitioners have standing under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution in this case.”).
10. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
11. Id.
12. Perry v. Brown, 725 F.3d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013).
13. Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of
Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
14. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
15. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
16. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
17. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 2012).
18. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786, 787 (2012) (“In addition to the question
presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions:
Whether the Executive Branch’s agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional
deprives this Court of jurisdiction to decide this case; and whether the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in this case.”).
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controversy before it, despite the administration’s agreement with the
plaintiff’s constitutional interpretation.19 On the merits, the Court
held that section 3 of DOMA violated the Constitution’s equal
protection guarantee as applied to same-sex couples validly married
under state law.20
Although Justice Scalia joined the majority in Perry holding that
Proposition 8’s sponsors lacked standing to appeal the trial court
ruling striking it down,21 he did not agree with the majority in
Windsor.22 Dissenting from the decision even to reach the merits, as
well as from the Court’s conclusion that on the merits section 3 of
DOMA was unconstitutional,23 he had nothing but disdain for the
majority opinion.24 After criticizing much of the majority’s
discussion of federalism, he leveled this (no pun intended) blistering
indictment at the Windsor majority opinion:
Some might conclude that this loaf [i.e., the opinion] could
have used a while longer in the oven. But that would be
wrong; it is already overcooked. The most expert care in
preparation cannot redeem a bad recipe. The sum of all the
Court’s nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid
(maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantivedue-process grounds, and maybe with some amorphous
federalism component playing a role) because it is
motivated by a “bare . . . desire to harm” couples in same-

19. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686 (“In this case the United States retains a stake sufficient to
support Article III jurisdiction on appeal and in proceedings before this Court.”); id. at 2688 (“For
these reasons, the prudential and Article III requirements are met here; and, as a consequence, the
Court need not decide whether BLAG would have standing to challenge the District Court's
ruling and its affirmance in the Court of Appeals on BLAG’s own authority.”).
20. See id. at 2693 (concluding that DOMA section 3 “violates basic due process and equal
protection principles applicable to the Federal Government”). Part III.B infra discusses at length
the equal protection grounding of the Supreme Court’s Windsor decision.
21. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2013).
22. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. See id. (“We have no power to decide this case. And even if we did, we have no power
under the Constitution to invalidate this democratically adopted legislation.”).
24. Rather than close his opinion with the customary “I respectfully dissent,” e.g., id. at 2720
(Alito, J., dissenting), Justice Scalia ended his Windsor dissent with the more blunt “I dissent.” Id.
at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even that was prefaced by the recriminatory assertion that “[w]e
owed both [sides in this controversy] better.” Id. See also id. at 2698 (labeling Court’s reasoning
as “jaw-dropping”); id. at 2701 (“The majority’s discussion of the requirements of Article III
bears no resemblance to our jurisprudence.”); id. at 2705 (“There are many remarkable things
about the majority’s merits holding. The first is how rootless and shifting its justifications are.”).
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sex marriages.25
This Article takes up Justice Scalia’s concern for the allegedly
“amorphous” role of federalism in the Windsor opinion. First,
though, Part II turns to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry. It
summarizes the litigation, teases out divergent views of federalism’s
relevance of federalism for the Court’s standing ruling, identifies the
problematic constitutional underpinnings of the Perry dissenters’
view, and touches on Perry’s limited impact for the Supreme Court’s
Article III standing doctrine. Part III summarizes the Windsor
litigation, defends what should have been the self-evident conclusion
that the Supreme Court’s Windsor opinion is based on equal
protection, and unpacks its treatment of federalism. Part III also
explores some potential ramifications of the decision for challenges
to states’ refusals to recognize same-sex marriages from other states
or to allow same-sex couples to marry within their territory.
II. FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY
Although the role of federalism in Hollingsworth v. Perry is
more “amorphous” or inchoate than in United States v. Windsor, the
Justices’ opinions in Perry might nonetheless be usefully addressed
through a federalism lens. The majority opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts perhaps could be read to say we serve federalism by keeping
federal courts out of disputes lacking properly aggrieved parties, as
doing so keeps federal courts in a limited role that does not call for
them broadly to superintend state governance.26 The ideologically
mixed Perry dissenters invoke federalism, suggesting the majority
disserves federalism by disparaging states’ initiative processes.27 The
dissenters’ position presupposes that the Constitution values
initiative mechanisms, or at least a state’s freedom to choose one.
But as Hans Linde and others have argued, the initiative process is
constitutionally quite problematic.28 So, even if it is not
constitutionally forbidden, we certainly should not see the initiative
as constitutionally guaranteed (say in the same way the independence
of state legislatures from federal “commandeering” is held to be
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 2707.
Cf. infra text accompanying notes 75–76.
See infra notes 98–112 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.
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guaranteed),29 and so denying federal court standing to initiative
sponsors seeking to defend discriminatory measures should not be
seen as a harm to the constitutional order.
Section A of this part summarizes the Perry litigation up to and
including in the Supreme Court. Section B identifies and analyzes a
disagreement among the Justices about how the Court should apply
principles of federalism to state initiative processes. Section C
recounts some of the constitutional concerns about state initiatives,
especially ones like Proposition 8 that target minority populations for
unfavorable treatment, concerns which undermine the dissent’s view
on this issue. Section D then explains why the Court’s Article III
standing holding is likely to have only minor effects on the cases that
can come before the federal courts. Perry thus may ultimately be
more significant for the large numbers of people it allows to be
married than for its doctrinal holding.
A. The Perry Litigation
In May of 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled in In re
Marriage Cases that the state constitution’s equal protection
guarantee and its fundamental right to marry required that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage be subjected to
strict scrutiny. The court held that the exclusion failed such scrutiny
and was therefore unconstitutional.30 From June 2008 through
November 4, 2008, an estimated 18,000 same-sex couples were
married in the state.31 On November 4, 2008, election day, the voters
of the state were asked to approve Proposition 8, an initiative that
would amend the California Constitution to strip away same-sex
couples’ right to marry. And the voters did so, supporting Prop 8 by
a vote of approximately 52 percent to 48 percent.32
The next day, a number of persons filed suit in state court,33
arguing that Prop 8 was impermissibly adopted via the initiative
process because it was not a mere “amendment” to the state
29. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
30. 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008).
31. David B. Cruz, Californians Enshrine Discrimination in Constitution, CRUZLINES.ORG
(Nov. 5, 2008), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2008/11/californians-enshrine-discrimination-in
.html.
32. Id.
33. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 65–66 (Cal. 2009).
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constitution, but a more profound “revision,” requiring approval by
the legislature.34 Proposition 8’s proponents or official sponsors
defended their measure in court because the governor thought the
state supreme court should invalidate it35 and the attorney general
affirmatively argued that it was unconstitutional.36 After oral
arguments in which former U.S. Solicitor General Kenneth Starr
argued for the measure’s defenders, the California Supreme Court
rejected the revision argument and upheld Prop 8.37 Justice Carlos
Moreno was the sole dissenter.38
Four days before the California Supreme Court rejected that last
state-law challenge to Proposition 8,39 two same-sex couples, Kris
Perry and Sandy Stier, and Paul Katami and Jeff Zarillo, filed suit in
federal court.40 The plaintiffs were represented by the political odd
couple of David Boies and Ted Olson, the attorneys who had
represented rival presidential candidates before the Supreme Court in
Bush v. Gore in 2000.41 They argued that Prop 8 violated same-sex
couples’ federal constitutional right to equal protection and
fundamental right to marry.42 Boies and Olson were hoping to fasttrack the litigation up to the U.S. Supreme Court,43 but Chief Judge
34. Id. at 60–62, 68, 88.
35. Maura Dolan, Justices Will Hear Prop. 8 Challenges: State Supreme Court Agrees to
Take Up the Lawsuits Next Spring but Refuses to Stay a Ban on Same-Sex Marriages, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/20/local/me-prop8-supreme-court20.
36. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 63, 116 (presenting the attorney general’s argument that state
constitutional amendments that abrogate fundamental rights must pass a “compelling interest”
test that Proposition 8 fails).
37. Id. at 48; David Edwards & Stephen P. Webster, Arguing for Prop. 8, Ken Starr Says
Any Right Can Be Taken, RAW STORY (Mar. 5, 2009), http://rawstory.com/news/2008
/Ken_Starr_argues_for_Prop_8_0305.html.
38. David B. Cruz, Equality’s Centrality: Proposition 8 and the California Constitution, 19
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUSTICE 45, 48 (2010) (recounting the background to the Proposition 8
litigation through the California Supreme Court decision rejecting the revision argument).
39. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 48.
40. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010), 2009 WL 1490740, at *1.
41. Ross Todd, Marriage Brokers, AM. LAW. (Mar. 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
news/Documents/GibsonDunnMarriageBrokers-AmLaw-3-11.pdf.
42. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929–30 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
43. See, e.g., Prop 8 on Trial, EQUAL. CAL., http://www.eqca.org/site/pp.asp?b=
5716101&c=kuLRJ9MRKrH (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (noting for July 2009 that “Counsel for
plaintiffs and the intervenor-defendants (Prop 8's proponents) say the case instead should be
resolved quickly in the district court based on legal briefs without evidentiary findings” rather
than have a factual trial); Margaret Talbot, Closing Time, NEW YORKER (June 16, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/ 2010/06/closing-time.html (noting during the
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Vaughn Walker of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California insisted that the parties have a full trial.44
The parties included the City and County of San Francisco,
which intervened as a plaintiff challenging Prop 8, as well as the
initiative’s proponents, the private individuals who had qualified the
measure for the ballot.45 The proponents intervened as defendants
seeking to uphold the law at least in part because neither the
governor nor the attorney general of California was going to defend
Prop 8 in the litigation.46 At the close of a trial in which the
plaintiffs’ witnesses dramatically outnumbered47 and were more
Perry trial that “Boies and Olson hope the Perry case will be appealed all the way up to the
Supreme Court”); Todd supra note 41 (“When Boies and Olson filed suit in San Francisco federal
district court on May 22, 2009, they thought a ruling on their motion for preliminary injunction
would create grounds for a quick appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Neither expected the case to go to trial.”).
44. Scott Shafer, Prop 8 Judge Vaughn Walker: Courts’ Change on Same-Sex Marriage Was
‘Utterly Unimaginable,’ KQED NEWS FIX (June 12, 2013), http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix
/2013/06/11/vaughn-walker (noting that “Walker ch[o]se to hold a trial with witnesses, rather
than just take briefs and make a ruling”).
45. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928–29.
46. See id. at 928.
47. Maura Dolan, Prop. 8 Judge Wants a Discussion of ‘Choice’ in Sexual Orientation, L.A.
TIMES, June 15, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/15/local/la-me-prop8-trial-20100615
(“Opponents of Proposition 8 called 16 witnesses and supporters two.”). “Plaintiffs presented
eight lay witnesses, including the four plaintiffs, and nine expert witnesses.” Perry, 704 F. Supp.
2d at 932. “Historian Nancy Cott testified about the public institution of marriage and the state's
interest in recognizing and regulating marriages.” Id. at 933. “Psychologist Letitia Anne Peplau
testified that couples benefit both physically and economically when they are married. . . .
Economist Lee Badgett provided evidence that same-sex couples would benefit economically if
they were able to marry and that same-sex marriage would have no adverse effect on the
institution of marriage or on opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 934. “Psychologist Gregory Herek . . . .
conclu[ded] that the vast majority of people are consistent in their sexual orientation.” Id. at
934–35. “Social epidemiologist Ilan Meyer testified about the harm gays and lesbians have
experienced because of Proposition 8. . . . Psychologist Michael Lamb testified that all available
evidence shows that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted
as children raised by heterosexual parents and that the gender of a parent is immaterial to whether
an adult is a good parent.” Id. at 935. “San Francisco economist Edmund Egan testified that states
receive greater economic benefits from marriage than from domestic partnerships.” Id. at 936.
“Historian George Chauncey testified about a direct relationship between the Proposition 8
campaign and initiative campaigns from the 1970s targeting gays and lesbians; . . . the
advertisements relied on a cultural understanding that gays and lesbians are dangerous to
children. [¶] This understanding, Chauncey observed, is an artifact of the discrimination gays and
lesbians faced in the United States in the twentieth century.” Id. at 937. “Political scientist Gary
Segura . . . . conclu[ded] that gays and lesbians lack political power.” Id. In contrast, “[d]espite
the multitude of benefits identified by [think tank founder David] Blankenhorn that would flow to
the state, to gays and lesbians and to American ideals were California to recognize same-sex
marriage, Blankenhorn testified that the state should not recognize same-sex marriage.
Blankenhorn reasoned that the benefits of same-sex marriage are not valuable enough because
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credible than the defense’s two witnesses,48 Judge Walker held that
Prop 8 unconstitutionally violated same-sex couples’ rights under the
Equal Protection Clause and fundamental constitutional right to
marry.49
The state defendants declined to appeal, but the proponents of
Prop 8 sought to do so, even though it was unclear to various
observers (and the plaintiffs challenging Prop 8) whether the
proponents had standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.50
Because the standing issue was also unclear to the court of appeals,
that court certified a question to the California Supreme Court as to
the proponents’ authority to defend Prop 8 under state law.51
Eventually, the state supreme court held that state law authorized the
proponents to assert the state’s interests and file appeals in defense of
Prop 8 when the state defendants refused to do so.52 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that this was good
same-sex marriage could conceivably weaken marriage as an institution.” Id. at 934
(identification at 933). And proponent’s proffered expert “[p]olitical scientist Kenneth Miller
disagreed with Segura's conclusion that gays and lesbians lack political power, pointing to some
successes on the state and national level and increased public support for gays and lesbians, but
agreed that popular initiatives can easily tap into a strain of antiminority sentiment and that at
least some voters supported Proposition 8 because of anti-gay sentiment.” Id. at 937.
48. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 940 (“[T]he court finds that each of plaintiffs’ proffered
experts offered credible opinion testimony on the subjects identified.”); id. at 946–47 (“The court
now determines that [proponents’ proffered expert David] Blankenhorn’s testimony constitutes
inadmissible opinion testimony that should be given essentially no weight. . . . None of
Blankenhorn’s opinions is reliable.”); id. at 950 (“Blankenhorn’s opinions are not supported by
reliable evidence or methodology and Blankenhorn failed to consider evidence contrary to his
view in presenting his testimony. The court therefore finds the opinions of Blankenhorn to be
unreliable and entitled to essentially no weight.”); id. at 952 (“[T]he court finds that [proponents’
proffered expert Kenneth P.] Miller’s opinions on gay and lesbian political power are entitled to
little weight and only to the extent they are amply supported by reliable evidence.”). See also id.
at 937 (“Proponent Hak-Shing William Tam testified about his role in the Proposition 8
campaign. . . . Tam testified that he is the secretary of the America Return to God Prayer
Movement, which operates the website ‘1man1woman.net.’ 1man1woman.net encouraged voters
to support Proposition 8 on grounds that homosexuals are twelve times more likely to molest
children, and because Proposition 8 will cause states one-by-one to fall into Satan’s hands.”).
49. Id. at 991, 993–94, 1002–03.
50. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Do the Prop 8 Proponents Have Standing to Appeal?,
CRUZLINES.ORG (Aug. 13, 2010), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2010/08/do-prop-8-proponents
-have-standing-to.html.
51. See David B. Cruz, California Supreme Court to Hear Prop 8 Case, Again,
CRUZLINES.ORG (Feb. 16, 2011), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2011/02/california-supreme
-court-to-hear-prop-8.html.
52. David B. Cruz, CA Supreme Court’s Disappointing Standing Decision, CRUZLINES.ORG
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/search?q=ca+supreme+court%27s+disappointing
+standing+decision.
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enough to give the proponents standing in federal court, but that Prop
8 was unconstitutional, although based on California-specific
grounds narrower than Judge Walker’s ruling relied on.53
The proponents then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review
that decision, and the Court agreed to do so on the same day it agreed
to hear United States v. Windsor.54 In granting review in Perry, the
Supreme Court also provided that “[i]n addition to the question
presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue
the following question: Whether petitioners have standing under
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution in this case.”55 The Court heard
arguments in March 2013, and three months later by a five-to-four
vote it dismissed the proponents’ appeal, vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals, and remanded the case to that court with instruction
to dismiss the proponents’ appeal from the trial court ruling
invalidating Prop 8.56
The primary problems for the Supreme Court majority were that
the proponents had no concrete personal injury from the decision
holding Prop 8 unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement and
that they were not state officials who might properly assert the state’s
interests in defense of the law in federal court.57 For decades, the
Court has interpreted Article III of the Constitution to impose certain
requirements for someone to have standing to invoke the federal
judicial power.58 Among those is the requirement that a plaintiff or
appellant have suffered a personal injury that is concrete and
particularized, not an abstract ideological grievance.59 The couples
who filed suit in federal court to challenge Prop 8 had such an injury,
as the measure compelled the state to deny them marriage licenses
and the rights that would have accompanied being married.60 But
53. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012).
54. David B. Cruz, Supreme Court to Hear Challenges to Prop 8 and DOMA Section 3,
CRUZLINES.ORG (Dec. 7, 2012), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2012/12/supreme-court-to-hear
-challenges-to.html.
55. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
56. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2658, 2668 (2013).
57. Id. at 2662, 2665–66.
58. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
59. See, e.g., id. at 560, 573–77.
60. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010). California law
did offer same-sex couples and couples one member of whom was at least sixty-two years of age
the option of entering into a registered “domestic partnership,” which provided the statecontrolled rights of marriage to couples who enter one, see, e.g., id. at 994, though that would not
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when the trial court ruled in their favor and entered a permanent
injunction, the proponents of the measure were not comparably
harmed. They strongly favored the law they had championed,
believed it constitutional, and wished to see it enforced.61 But those
are ideological concerns, not Article III injuries under the Court’s
case law.
The proponents’ only alternative route to standing would have
been to wrap themselves in the mantle of the state’s authority. The
litigants on both sides did not doubt that a state has Article III
standing to defend its laws and is sufficiently injured by federal court
rulings holding them unconstitutional that it could appeal such
decisions in federal court.62 The problem for the Supreme Court in
Perry, however, was that the Justices in the majority did not view the
proponents as the state, agents of the state, or the people of the
state.63 In arguing that they had standing the proponents,64 like the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,65 had relied on the California
Supreme Court decision66 holding that California law authorized
initiative sponsors in their position to assert the state’s interests in
defense of their initiative and to take appeals from decisions ruling it
unconstitutional. For the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, however, this was insufficient.67 In the majority’s eyes, the
proponents “hold no office and have always participated in this
litigation solely as private parties.”68 Besides holding no office, the
generally qualify them for benefits that other states or the federal government provide only to
married couples.
61. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (mentioning that the Ninth
Circuit held that proponents had standing to appeal).
62. Brief of Petitioners at 12, 15, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.
12-144) 2013 WL 457384; Brief in Opposition at 12, Hollingsworth v. Perry 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144).
63. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2666. Although the litigation most commonly referred to “the state’s
interests,” this is really shorthand for the interests of the people of the state. Cf. Perry v. Brown,
671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is for the State of California to decide who may assert its
interests in litigation, and we respect its decision by holding that Proposition 8's proponents have
standing to bring this appeal on behalf of the State. We therefore conclude that, through the
proponents of ballot measures, the People of California must be allowed to defend in federal
courts, including on appeal, the validity of their use of the initiative power.”).
64. Brief of Petitioners, at 12, 15–16, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.
12-144), 2013 WL 457384.
65. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012).
66. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006–07 (Cal. 2011).
67. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2664.
68. Id. at 2665.
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proponents lacked “the most basic features of an agency
relationship.”69 The proponents “answer to no one; they decide for
themselves, with no review, what arguments to make and how to
make them. Unlike California’s attorney general, they are not elected
at regular intervals—or elected at all. No provision provides for their
removal.”70
B. The Justices’ Disparate Views of Federalism: State Law and
Federal Standing
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion opened with
recognition that the underlying substantive issue in the case is
currently subject to political contestation: “The public is currently
engaged in an active political debate over whether same-sex couples
should be allowed to marry.”71 From a federalism perspective, this
might counsel in favor of allowing federal appellate courts to reverse
the trial court decision and to uphold California’s adoption of
Proposition 8. Instead, separation of powers trumped the democratic
process concern, and the Court held that Proposition 8’s sponsors
lacked Article III standing to appeal in order to litigate its
constitutionality: “Federal courts have authority under the
Constitution to answer such questions only if necessary to do so in
the course of deciding an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”72 The Court
characterized the policymaking concern behind its standing doctrine
in terms of separation of powers: “It ensures that we act as judges,
and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected
representatives.”73 But this policymaking concern could also be
thought of in terms of federalism; after all, the “elected
representatives” who are largely responsible for regulating marriage
in our constitutional order are state legislators, not members of
Congress.74
69. Id. at 2666.
70. Id. at 2666–67 (internal citations omitted).
71. Id. at 2659.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Of course, such reasoning would not be expressly supported by current standing
doctrine, where the Court has said that the standing limitation derived from Article III “is built on
a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752
(1984).
The statement in the main text is of course a bit of an oversimplification. Congress could
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The Perry majority recounted the Ninth Circuit’s standing
analysis, which had relied on the California Supreme Court’s answer
to the Ninth Circuit panel’s certified question regarding the
proponents’ authority under state law.75 California, the U.S. Supreme
Court reasoned, “has standing to defend the constitutionality of its
[laws],” and states have the “prerogative, as independent sovereigns,
to decide for themselves who may assert their interests.”76 The Ninth
Circuit thought that “[a]ll a federal court need determine is that the
state has suffered a harm sufficient to confer standing and that the
party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court is authorized by
the state to represent its interest in remedying that harm.”77 But the
majority in Perry rejected the view that a state is free to authorize
whomever it wants to represent its interests and thereby create
federal standing.78
To repeat, the Court spoke of standing in separation of powers
terms: “The doctrine of standing, we recently explained, ‘serves to
prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of
the political branches.’”79 The Court referred to “this ‘overriding and
time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its
proper constitutional sphere . . . .’”80 But a federal court’s—even the
Supreme Court’s—“proper constitutional sphere” respects both
horizontal separation of powers and vertical separation, known as
federalism.
The Court recognized that California law, constitutional and
statutory, gave the proponents “a ‘unique,’ ‘special,’ and ‘distinct’
role in the initiative process”—“but only when it comes to the

exercise its plenary power over the District of Columbia, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, to
prescribe eligibility criteria for marriage within the District. Indian tribes also prescribe eligibility
criteria for marriages, and some tribes have allowed same-sex couples to marry. See, e.g., David
B. Cruz, Getting Sex “Right”: Heteronormativity and Biologism in Trans and Intersex Marriage
Litigation and Scholarship, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 203, 203–04 n.1 (2010) (discussing
the Coquille Tribe); Steven Gardner, Suquamish Tribe Approves Same-Sex Marriage, KITSAP
SUN (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2011/aug/01/suquamish-tribe-approves
-same-sex-marriage/.
75. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.
76. Id. (quoting Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052, 1070, 1071 (2012) and Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)).
77. Id. at 2664 (quoting Perry, 671 F.3d at 1072).
78. Id. at 2667.
79. Id. at 2661 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013)).
80. Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997)).
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process of enacting the law.”81 Under the California Supreme Court’s
authoritative construction of state law, the proponents had “no role—
special or otherwise—in the enforcement of Proposition 8.”82 This
meant that they had no “personal stake” in defending Prop 8’s
enforcement that was not shared by California voters at large. Their
complaint that the lower federal courts had enjoined Prop 8 was
therefore a mere generalized grievance insufficient to confer federal
standing,83 even though the state was content to have the proponents
represent its interests.
The majority agreed that “a State must be able to designate
agents to represent it in federal court,” and that “state law may
provide for [certain] officials to speak for the State in federal
court.”84 Yet the Supreme Court refused to view the proponents of
Proposition 8 as “agents of the people” of California.85 The majority
opinion in Perry did not see the proponents as substantive or formal
agents of the state.86 The California Supreme Court did not describe
the proponents as agents.87 Moreover, the proponents “answer to no
one; they decide for themselves, with no review, what arguments to
make and how to make them.88 Unlike California’s attorney general,
they are not elected at regular intervals—or elected at all.89 No
provision provides for their removal.”90 As one amicus explained,
“the proponents apparently have an unelected appointment for an
unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative, however and
to whatever extent they choose to defend it.”91 The proponents, who
never took any oath of office, had no fiduciary obligation to the

81. Id. at 2662 (quoting Reply Brief at 5 (quoting Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1126,
1142, 1160 (2011))).
82. Id. at 2663.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2664 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 2666.
86. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed, Prop. 8 Deserved a Defense, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/28/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-proposition-8-initiatives
-20130628 (agreeing that the proponents of Prop. 8 lacked standing and suggesting that states
appoint a special state attorney when other officials refuse to defend an initiative).
87. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2666.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2667.
91. Id at 2667 (quoting Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 23, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144)).
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people of California.92 This was not purely a formalistic distinction
devoid of potential consequence; as the majority in Perry explained,
the proponents were accordingly “free to pursue a purely ideological
commitment to the law’s constitutionality without the need to take
cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or
potential ramifications for other state priorities.”93 Their litigation
decisions and arguments thus might differ from those of someone
facing more accountability constraints.
The Justices in the majority rejected the dissent’s suggestion that
by denying federal standing to the proponents of Prop 8 they were
“disrespect[ing]” or “disparag[ing]” the reasons the California
Supreme Court relied upon in authoritatively construing state law to
give the proponents authority to defend the proposition.94 The
majority was at pains not to “question California’s sovereign right to
maintain an initiative process, or the right of initiative proponents to
defend their initiatives in California courts, where Article III does
not apply.”95 But “no matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a
private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized
grievance cannot override our settled law to the contrary.”96 In
conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “We have never before
upheld the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality
of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline
to do so for the first time here.”97
As just suggested, the Perry dissenters, including both
conservative and more liberal Justices,98 saw things very differently
from the majority. After opening by lavishing unwarranted praise on
the California Supreme Court opinion responding to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals,99 the dissent charged that the majority
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2667.
97. Id. at 2668.
98. Justice Kennedy authored the dissent in Perry and was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito,
and Sotomayor. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (asserting that the “state-law issues have been addressed in a meticulous and
unanimous opinion by the Supreme Court of California”). I described many of that opinion’s
shortcomings on my blog. See David B. Cruz, CA Supreme Court’s Disappointing Standing
Decision, CRUZLINES.ORG, (Nov. 17, 2011, 11:55 PM), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2011/11
/ca-supreme-courts-disappointing.html (concluding that the state Supreme Court “does not even
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opinion’s “reasoning does not take into account the fundamental
principles or the practical dynamics of the initiative system in
California.”100 And the dissenters worried not only about California
but also about the “implications for the 26 other States that use an
initiative or popular referendum system and which, like California,
may choose to have initiative proponents stand in for the State when
public officials decline to defend an initiative in litigation.”101
The Perry dissenters complained that “[t]here is no basis for this
Court to set aside the California Supreme Court’s determination of
state law.”102 That phrasing implies that, in the dissenters’ view, the
majority had told California that its law was not what the state
supreme court interpreted it to mean. But the Perry majority did
nothing of the sort. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, even
assuming California law is as the state high court ruled, that is
insufficient to satisfy the standing requirements the Court has
interpreted Article III to impose.103
If this language about “setting aside” an authoritative state law
interpretation is dismissed as merely infelicitous, the dissent’s core
complaint was that the Perry majority wrongly refused to interpret
Article III to allow a state to do what the majority believed California
had attempted to do here: grant certain private parties the state’s
authority to defend a law, even in federal court, but not the authority
to enforce it. To prevent elected officials such as the governor and
the attorney general of a state like California from having a “de facto
veto” over state law adopted through the initiative process,104 the
dissenters believed that “California finds it necessary to vest the
responsibility and right to defend a voter-approved initiative in the
initiative’s proponents when the State Executive declines to do

pretend to try to parse the meaning of the provisions of law on which it claims it is basing its
decision”).
100. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2670.
103. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion) (“[S]tanding in a federal court is a question of federal law,
not state law. And no matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should have
standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override our settled law to the
contrary.”).
104. Cruz, supra note 99 (explaining why it is incorrect, at least in the posture of cases such
as Perry, to believe that “veto” or “nullification” of Proposition 8 was really at issue).
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so.”105 In the dissenters’ view, the majority’s refusal “to allow a
State’s authorized representatives to defend the outcome of a
democratic election,”106 here Prop 8, “disrespects and disparages
both the political process in California and the well-stated opinion of
the California Supreme Court in this case.”107
The dissenters believed the majority interpreted Article III to
deny states the latitude they required to craft initiatives that aligned
with citizens’ goals regardless of what elected representatives might
conclude about the constitutionality of such desires.108 The dissenters
reasoned that through California’s choice (discerned or imposed by
the state supreme court109) to let private sponsors of initiatives
defend their measures in court, the state “define[d] itself as a
sovereign.”110Article III ought therefore to be interpreted to allow
states such choices. It is this vision of federalism that animated the
Perry dissenters.111 Thus, for them, “Article III does not require
California, when deciding who may appear in court to defend an
initiative on its behalf, to comply with . . . this Court’s view of how a
State should make its laws or structure its government.”112

105. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2674.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., id. at 2675 (“In the end, what the Court fails to grasp or accept is the basic
premise of the initiative process. And it is this. The essence of democracy is that the right to make
law rests in the people and flows to the government, not the other way around. Freedom resides
first in the people without need of a grant from the government.”).
109. See Cruz, supra note 99 (“[T]he [state supreme] court is not interpreting but clearly
adding to the words of the state constitution and the Election Code.”).
110. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. See e.g., id. (“In California and the 26 other States that permit initiatives and popular
referendums, the people have exercised their own inherent sovereign right to govern themselves.
The Court today frustrates that choice . . . .”); id. at 2668 (insisting that “the State Supreme
Court’s definition of proponents’ powers is binding on this Court”); id. at 2669 (“It is for
California, not this Court, to determine whether and to what extent the Elections Code provisions
are instructive and relevant in determining the authority of proponents to assert the State’s interest
in postenactment judicial proceedings. And it is likewise not for this Court to say that a State
must determine the substance and meaning of its laws by statute, or by judicial decision, or by a
combination of the two. That, too, is for the State to decide.” (internal citations omitted)).
Although the dissent charges that the majority “fails to abide by precedent and misapplies basic
principles of justiciability,” id. at 2675, even some people who believe that initiative sponsors
ought to have standing have nonetheless concluded that they do not given current California law
and Article III standing doctrine. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 86 (“The Supreme Court's
decision to dismiss a challenge to Proposition 8 on Wednesday followed well-established law
with regard to standing in federal court.”).
112. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The majority, however, does not say that Article III or anything
else in the Constitution prevents states from vesting such authority in
proponents of initiative measures. It simply says that, without more,
a state’s decision to grant such authority does not vest those
proponents with federal standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to defend such measures against constitutional
challenge. The majority and dissenting Justices’ disagreement over
the propriety of this holding stems from their apparent disagreement
over the nature of federalism dictated by the Constitution, and the
place of initiative measures in that scheme of federalism.
C. The Constitutional Problematics of Direct Democracy and
Proposition 8
If the Constitution guaranteed states the prerogative to adopt
initiative and referendum lawmaking, and if federal court standing
for the sponsors of such measures to defend them, including by
appealing adverse trial court rulings when elected officials refuse to
do so, were necessary to make such lawmaking effective, then the
Perry dissenters would have a more powerful argument that the
majority’s denial of standing disserved “Our Federalism.”113 If those
preconditions were met, then the majority’s ruling arguably would
have deprived states of the constitutionally protected power to
empower initiative sponsors to appeal federal court rulings holding
their measures unconstitutional. Yet both of these argumentative
preconditions are deeply questionable.
I have previously detailed reasons that California’s initiative
power should not be understood to have been vitiated by the denial
of Article III standing for sponsors to defend their initiatives.114
Briefly: As the same-sex couple plaintiffs in Perry noted and the
California Supreme Court conceded, “invalidation of Proposition 8
in the underlying federal litigation did not result from any action or
inaction by the Governor or Attorney General but from a decision by
the federal district court after a contested trial.”115 Clearly “there is
113. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (discussing the origins of the
term “Our Federalism,” and how this term conceptualizes a national government that will act “in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States”).
114. See generally Cruz, supra note 99 (arguing that a proponent’s lack of standing in federal
court will not undermine California’s initiative process).
115. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 n.18 (Cal. 2011) (internal quotation marks
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no risk of ‘effective nullification’” in state courts,116 where
California can grant proposition sponsors standing to defend. And in
federal court, a case would only be litigated if the plaintiffs have an
adequate injury for standing, in which case the proponents of the
measure would not need to have standing on their own to intervene
as defendants, after which the measure would receive “a ‘competent
and spirited defense,’ and a federal judicial decision invalidating the
measure therefore cannot be pejoratively labeled a state officer
‘nullification.’”117 It is therefore unlikely that federal standing to
appeal is necessary for the second precondition of the Perry
dissenters’ reasoning to be satisfied.
Nor is the first precondition likely satisfied. It is doubtful that
the Constitution guarantees states the prerogative to adopt initiative
and referendum lawmaking, at least in the context of a measure
targeting lesbigay people for disfavorable treatment.118 As former
state supreme court Justice Hans Linde argued two decades ago,119
such measures may well violate the Guarantee Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”120
Republican government in the states was distinguished by the
Clause’s drafters from direct democracy.121 And certain usages of
direct democracy are problematic for the same kinds of reasons that
motivated the Guarantee Clause’s framers. “A statewide initiative
may be a legitimate process for enacting a gross receipts tax and not
for raising social barriers between groups of citizens.”122 Linde’s
study of the founding generation’s understanding of republicanism
led him to conclude that it “depended on deliberation by
representative institutions not only for rational public policies; it also

omitted).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. See David B. Cruz, Repealing Rights: Proposition 8, Perry, and Crawford
Contextualized, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 241 (2013) (defending conclusion that
“Prop 8 takes the right to marry the person of one’s choice away from lesbian, gay, and bisexual
persons but not from heterosexually identified persons”).
119. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993).
120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
121. Linde, supra note 119, at 22.
122. Id. at 31.
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was the essential safeguard of civil and religious rights.”123
Capture of state power by religious majorities to impose their
standards on dissidents was a particular fear of that generation,124
and so, Linde argues, a core concern of the Guarantee Clause. Where
group passions about morality animate public policy and invite a
state’s “citizens to choose sides between the righteous and the
sinners, between the homosexual minority and the heterosexual
majority,”125 republican government has failed. For
the design of republican government, embodied in the
Constitution eighty years before the Fourteenth
Amendment, would not allow such policies to be put to a
statewide plebiscite upon initiative petitions that bypass
deliberation by elected legislators and governors (and, when
amending the state constitution, by the courts). Rather, such
deliberations were the only guarantee safeguarding
minorities against unmediated swings of majority
passions.126
Linde was writing in the context of Oregon’s proposed Measure
9, which lumped “homosexuality” together with “pedophilia, sadism
[and] masochism”; prohibited the State from legislating against
sexual orientation discrimination or otherwise “recogniz[ing]” the
category “homosexuality”; forbade the government to “promote,
encourage, or facilitate homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or
masochism”; and directed public schools in particular to “assist in
setting a standard for Oregon’s youth that recognizes homosexuality,
pedophilia, sadism and masochism as abnormal, wrong, unnatural,
and perverse and that these behaviors are to be discouraged and
avoided.”127 California’s Proposition 8, though less inflammatory in
tone, raises very similar structural concerns.
Prop 8 reflects a social “dividing practice,”128 discriminates with
respect to an important societal institution, and selectively overrides
the state’s equality and fundamental rights guarantees, all without
123. Id. at 33.
124. See id. at 35.
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id. at 37.
127. Id. at 36 n.71.
128. For a brief discussion of the provenance and significance of “dividing practices,” see
David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1003 n.30 (2002).
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having been tempered by the representative legislative process. Prop
8 seeks to draw a stark line between the people in same-sex couples
and those in different-sex couples, and thus largely between lesbigay
and heterosexually identified persons, with the latter treated as more
valuable or significant.129 This dividing practice is a prime example
of the kind of factionalism Linde was addressing. Prop 8
discriminates with respect to marriage, which is a distinctively
important societal institution.130 This heightens the harm the measure
wrought—harms which were never addressed and assessed through
legislative deliberation because Prop 8 was proposed via the
initiative process. Prop 8 also sought to override the California
Supreme Court’s determinations that “all adult Californians enjoy a
fundamental right to marry the person of their choice” and “that
sexual orientation is a suspect classification under the California
Constitution, such that government action discriminating on the basis
of sexual orientation, including the exclusion of same–sex couples
from civil marriage, is likewise subject to strict scrutiny.”131 Prop 8,
by “requiring discrimination against a group defined by a suspect
classification with respect to a fundamental right, thus violat[ed] the
foundational guarantee of equal citizenship in the California

129. Michael Dorf has explained why exclusionary marriage laws such as California’s
Proposition 8 are reasonably regarded as expressing a second-class status for lesbigay persons.
See generally Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267 (2011).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (recognizing “the
understanding that marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory
benefits”); id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing marriage as “an institution so central
to the lives of so many”); id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing “[t]he family” as “an
ancient and universal human institution”); id. at 2720 (speculating that Congress “viewed
marriage as a valuable institution to be fostered and . . . viewed married couples as comprising a
unique type of economic unit that merits special regulatory treatment”); cf. In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 399 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that “the substantive right of two adults who share a
loving relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized family of their own—
and, if the couple chooses, to raise children within that family—constitutes a vitally important
attribute of the fundamental interest in liberty and personal autonomy that the California
Constitution secures to all persons for the benefit of both the individual and society”); id. at 424
(“[P]ast California decisions have described marriage as the most socially productive and
individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954–55 (Mass. 2003)
(describing civil marriage as “a social institution of the highest importance” and observing that
“[t]he benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every
aspect of life and death.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131. Cruz, supra note 38, at 47.
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Constitution” as that document is best understood.132 The rampant,
unfiltered factionalism at work in Prop 8 thus selectively stripped
away some of the most fundamental guarantees of fairness
previously offered by the California Constitution. This, too, shows
that Linde’s concerns about Oregon’s Measure 9 are also raised as
strongly by California’s Proposition 8.
Consequently, states might never have the option, let alone a
constitutionally protected prerogative, to adopt a measure such as
Proposition 8 via an initiative process, bypassing the legislature, and,
even if permissible, the Constitution should not be thought to place
any special value on a state’s doing so. My argument is not that
measures that violate constitutional equal protection principles
should therefore be thought also to violate the Guarantee Clause.
Rather, direct democracy is sufficiently constitutionally
problematic—at least when it comes to minority-targeting measures
like Prop 8, regardless of whether such measures in fact violate equal
protection—that it should not be regarded as a weighty criticism if a
constitutional doctrine does not zealously protect state power to use
an unfettered initiative process to strip minorities of rights. The fact
that the Perry majority rejected the Prop 8 proponents’ and the
dissenting Justices’ invitations to take Article III standing doctrine
down the path of empowering states to place appellate defense of
discriminatory initiative measures in the hands of private persons
lacking any meaningful accountability133 or role constraints should
carry little weight as an indictment of the majority’s reasoning.
“Our Federalism” ought not be understood as prizing a state’s
ability to treat minorities the way the Perry dissenters would have
privileged it. The majority’s rejection of the dissent’s federalismbased arguments shows, at a minimum, that such putative state
prerogatives rank low in a hierarchy of constitutional values.
Maintaining a federal judiciary with a limited role and insisting that a
state’s litigation agents truly represent the people of the state clearly
trumped the dissenters’ more robust view of states’ rights. It is of

132. Id. at 47–48.
133. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013) (“[P]etitioners answer to no
one. . . . Unlike California’s attorney general, they are not elected”); but see id. at 2672 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (“[The initiative] proponents, too, can have their authority terminated or their
initiative overridden by a subsequent ballot measure.”).
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course true that the Perry majority’s analysis limits the standing of
all personally uninjured parties in whom a state might seek to vest
defense of any initiative, not just initiatives targeting minorities in
ways similar to California’s Proposition 8.134 But this seems a
modest price to pay for a federal standing doctrine that would not
aggrandize those who would turn state law direct democracy
provisions against politically vulnerable minorities.135
As a predictive matter, it should be noted that the Supreme
Court seems unlikely any time soon to hold that initiatives and
referenda are categorically unconstitutional, although some scholars
have taken that position.136 Indeed, in April 2014 in Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,137 the Court reversed a case
from Michigan where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional138 a state initiative that amended Michigan’s
constitution to bar affirmative action or any consideration of “on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin” in public
colleges and universities, “public employment, public education, or
public contracting.”139 Although Schuette presented the Court only
with an equal protection challenge to Michigan’s law,140 Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion did more broadly suggest that “[t]here is
no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this Court's
precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit
this policy determination to the voters.”141 The current Court displays
marked hostility to race-based government action even when
designed to include historically excluded minorities.142 And in 1996,
134. See generally id. (majority opinion).
135. See Linde, supra note 119, at 32–38 (explaining that direct democracy initiatives that
target minorities subjecting them to the swings of majority passions threaten republicanism).
136. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the Republic for Which It
Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057,
1059 (1996) (arguing “that the Guarantee Clause establishes a per se prohibition against state
initiatives”).
137. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
138. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir.
2012), rev’d 134 S. Ct. 1623.
139. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
140. See id. at 1629 (“The Court in this case must determine whether an amendment to the
Constitution of the State of Michigan, approved and enacted by its voters, is invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause ….”).
141. Id. at 1638.
142. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (invalidating municipal rejection of
promotion test that had not been validated for the firefighter positions at issue after test produced
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with a less conservative bench of Justices,143 the Court went out of
its way to avoid relying on cases striking down initiative measures
that operated to the particular detriment of racial minorities.144 Given
all this, this Court is unlikely to rule broadly that use of the initiative
mechanism violates the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
That does not necessarily mean that it would hold that the
Constitution affirmatively protects or values states’ authority to make
law by initiative, or that the Court would not invalidate particular
anti-lesbigay ballot measures as unconstitutional, perhaps on the
ground that they are rooted in animus against lesbigay persons.
D. Future Defense of Prop 8 and Other State Initiatives
It is not apparent that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Perry will
have a major effect on standing determinations in other cases, for it
shuts courthouse doors in strikingly limited circumstances. First,
because Perry was rooted in Article III of the Constitution, it only
applies to litigation in federal courts; state courts are free to adopt
less restrictive standing rules and allow initiative proponents
standing to defend and take appeals in defense of the initiatives they
sponsored.145 Second, if you have an actually, nonideologically
injured party seeking to appeal, federal litigation remains open.146 If
significant disparate impact on minorities); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (invalidating race-based pupil-assignment schemes designed to avoid
extremes of racial isolation in schools in district at issue).
143. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y
TIMES, July 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html (concluding that by
the end of June 2010, the Roberts Court “became the most conservative one in living memory,
based on an analysis of four sets of political science data”).
144. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (affirming on a “different” rationale a state
court decision that had invalidated an anti-lesbigay state constitutional amendment “because it
infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process,” a right
the state court had derived in part from Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), and Washington
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), cases the Romer Court characterized as
“involving discriminatory restructuring of governmental decisionmaking”). Romer relied on the
Equal Protection Clause, rather than federalism, to protect lesbigay people from Colorado’s antigay state constitutional amendment. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
145. Cf. Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A. 3d 336, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013)
(“New Jersey courts are not limited to the case or controversy requirement imposed on the federal
courts by way of Article III of the Federal Constitution.” (internal citation omitted)).
146. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry at 31, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12-144) (remarks of Roberts, C.J.) available at http://www.supremecourt.gov
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-144a.pdf (“I suppose there might be people out there
with their own personal standing, someone who performs marriages and would like that to remain
open to everyone but would prefer not to perform same-sex marriages, or other people. We seem
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the district court and court of appeals had ruled against the Perry
plaintiffs and held that Prop 8 was constitutional, they would have
still been denied marriage licenses and would have had standing to
ask the Supreme Court to review that decision. If a member of a
same-sex couple married in California while Prop 8 was enjoined
contested the validity of the marriage by arguing that Prop 8 was in
fact constitutional, say in a dispute over custody or marital property,
he or she might be able to litigate the viability of Prop 8 and appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court.147 Or if a third party were tangibly
affected by a same-sex couple’s marital rights, that party could likely
claim injury and litigate the validity of Prop 8 and the marriage in
federal court. Third, if the state official defendants in Perry had
litigated the case and lost, they would have had federal standing even
under Perry to appeal to assert the state’s interests.148 Thus, only
cases that fail to satisfy all of these alternative conditions would
actually be governed by the Perry ruling.
At least one anti-LGBT group has tried to extend the reach of
the Supreme Court’s Perry decision. The Christian right legal
organization Liberty Counsel149 has argued that Perry limits
organizations’ ability to intervene as defendants. There is, however,
as I will address, a distinction between an organization’s procedural
entitlement to intervene in a federal case that already involves a
proper case or controversy, and the requirements for intervenors to
satisfy Article III standing doctrine in order to be able to take an
appeal, the issue that was before the Supreme Court in Perry.
Accordingly, Perry is unlikely to have an appreciable effect on

to be addressing the case as if the only options are the proponents here or the State. I'm not sure
there aren’t other people out there with individual personalized injury that would satisfy Article
III.”).
147. Due to the “domestic relations” exception to federal court jurisdiction, in a diversity suit
over property dependent on adjudicating the validity of the couple’s marriage, for example, the
party might not be able to file the suit in federal trial court. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
504 U.S. 689 (1992) (affirming the existence of, but ultimately finding inapplicable, the domestic
relations exception).
148. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013) (“No one doubts that a
State has a cognizable interest in the continued enforceability of its laws that is harmed by a
judicial decision declaring a state law unconstitutional.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
149. See About Us, LIBERTY COUNSEL, http://www.lc.org/index.cfm?pid=14096 (last visited
Aug. 22, 2013) (Liberty Counsel website characterizing the organization as a “Christian
Ministry” “dedicated to advancing religious freedom, the sanctity of life, and the family since
1989”).
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organizations’ ability to participate in litigation over legislation they
supported.
Liberty Counsel represented a group of plaintiffs in Pickup v.
Brown, a case presenting a constitutional challenge to California’s
statutory ban on efforts to change the sexual orientation of minors by
licensed mental healthcare professionals (“sexual orientation change
efforts” or “SOCE”).150 Pickup was appealed from the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.151 Two days after the Supreme Court’s Perry
decision, Liberty Counsel sent a letter to the Ninth Circuit arguing
that Perry precluded standing for “intervening parties such as
Equality California [‘EQCA’] in this case.”152 As Liberty Counsel
read Perry, “the Supreme Court held that a public interest group did
not have Article III standing to defend a law merely because it
supported the passage and adoption of such a law. . . . The Court
stated that public interest groups must have an actual injury to
continue to defend a law that it has supported.”153
As explained above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Perry held
that the ballot sponsors did not have standing to be litigating Prop 8
by themselves in federal court, and so could not appeal Judge
Walker’s decision where the state governmental defendants refused
to do so.154 Perry does not call into question the permissibility of the
ballot sponsors’ intervening in the federal trial court to help defend
Prop 8 in a proper case brought challenging Prop 8. Perry was a case
primarily about standing to appeal.155
Here, however, assuming the Pickup plaintiffs challenging
California’s ban on sexual orientation conversion practices on minors
had standing to sue in federal trial court, nothing in the Supreme
Court’s Perry decision states that interested groups cannot intervene
to defend the California law. And, assuming one or more parties with
150. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
151. Pickup v. Brown, 12-17681, 2012 WL 6869637 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012).
152. Plaintiff’s Citation of Supplemental Authorities, Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-17681), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2013/06
/28/12-17681%20Supplemental%20Authorities.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
155. Liberty Counsel’s letter saw the glass half empty, saying the Court of Appeals had
“merely accepted the district court’s grant of intervention.” Plaintiff’s Citation of Supplemental
Authorities, supra note 152.
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standing asked the Ninth Circuit to review a federal trial court
decision about the ban on appeal,156 it is not clear why anything in
Perry would keep the law’s backers like EQCA from continuing to
participate in the litigation. Perry presented a different situation in
that there would have been no appellate litigation without the Prop 8
sponsors’ filing an appeal.
In one of the two cases appealed to the Ninth Circuit, Pickup v.
Brown,157 consolidated on appeal with Welch v. Brown,158 the trial
court had ruled that the challengers were unlikely to prevail and
denied them a preliminary injunction.159 To the extent the Pickup
plaintiffs had standing to appeal that decision to the Ninth Circuit,
which they did if they had standing to file their federal court suit in
the first place, standing rules should not prevent the law’s supporters,
such as the pro-LGBT equality nonprofit organization EQCA, from
joining the state in defending the law on appeal.160 In Welch, the state
was preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the law at least in some
circumstances; it therefore has an injury that provides standing to
appeal,161 and since the state defendants chose to appeal,162 EQCA,
156. The state of California would be recognized by virtually all as having standing to appeal
the Welch decision which enjoined the state from enforcing its law banning SOCE on minors. If
the Pickup plaintiffs suffered an injury entitling them to challenge the law in federal court, then
that same injury would support their standing to appeal the trial court decision denying them
injunctive relief.
157. Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681, 2012 WL 6869637 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012).
158. Welch v. Brown, No. 13-15023 (9th Cir. 2012).
159. Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-cv-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *1 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 4, 2012).
160. In the appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel held that it need not decide whether EQCA had
standing to defend the state law “because the State of California undoubtedly has standing to
defend its statute, and the presence in a suit of even one party with standing suffices to make a
claim justiciable.” Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). On the merits, the court rejected the challenges to the law. Id. at 1222.
I should note that I assisted Equality California in understanding the potential outcomes
in the Supreme Court’s marriage cases and the preparation of press releases in conjunction
therewith and that I joined the board of its affiliated 501(c)(3) organization Equality California
Institute in January 2014.
161. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013) (“No one doubts that a
State has a cognizable interest ‘in the continued enforceability’ of its laws that is harmed by a
judicial decision declaring a state law unconstitutional.” (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131,
137 (1986)).
162. My view of the federalism concerns and state choices implicit in Perry differs from that
claimed to underlie both Perry and Windsor by Eric Restuccia and Aaron Lindstrom in
Federalism and the Authority of the States to Define Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-and-the-authority-of-the-states-to-define
-marriage/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2013). They lay emphasis on the fact that the attorney general of
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as the law’s nongovernmental backers, again, should be able to
continue to participate if it meets the federal standards for
intervention. (If it did not, then intervention would be improper, but
not because of the Supreme Court’s Perry decision.) Basically,
standing doctrine requires that there must be a case or controversy, a
real live dispute between parties with real stakes in the matter, for a
case to be in federal court. It is not totally settled, but a majority of
federal appeals courts have held that if there is such a dispute, then
others can participate in that litigation too without having to establish
standing on their own.163
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Pickup that the law
banning SOCE against minors does not violate the First
Amendment.164 Its opinion does not squarely address the effect of
Perry, if any, on the ability of a group like EQCA to intervene to
defend a law it supports that is germane to its members’ interests.
The Court of Appeals specifically concluded that it “need not resolve
[the] question” of Perry’s effect on EQCA’s ability to intervene
“because the State of California undoubtedly has standing to defend
its statute, and ‘the presence in a suit of even one party with standing
California chose not to defend or appeal the decision invalidating Proposition 8 and, rather
wishfully, see the Court as having protected California’s governmental choices to litigate or not.
See id. (“In Hollingsworth, the Court rejects the standing of private parties to defend the
constitutionality of a state statute where ‘state officials have chosen not to.’ On their face, as
holdings, these decisions respect the principles of federalism, honoring the exclusive authority of
the states to define and to defend marriage.”) The obvious problem with this states’ rights
Pollyannaism is that, at least according to the California Supreme Court, the state of California
had chosen to vest defense of Proposition 8 in its official proponents. Thus, the decisions by the
attorney general and governor of California not to defend the measure should not have been the
end of the Supreme Court’s concern, had the Court’s decision in Perry really been driven by
“state sovereignty.” Id.
163. See, e.g., Canadian Wheat Board v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1338–42 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2009) (addressing circuit split favoring no need for intervenors in a proper case or
controversy to establish their own Article III standing and siding with that majority view);
Melissa Waver, Where Standing Closes a Door, May Intervention Open a Window? Article III,
Rule 24(A), and Climate Change Solutions, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10945, 10952
& nn.105–07 (2012) (noting circuit split and same majority position).
164. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1048 (2013) (holding “that SB 1172, as a regulation of
professional conduct, does not violate the free speech rights of SOCE practitioners or minor
patients, is neither vague nor overbroad, and does not violate parents’ fundamental rights”),
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S.Ct. 2871 (2014). Due to the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately address their claim
“that SB 1172 violates the religion clauses of the First Amendment,” the court “decline[d] to
address” it but left it open for “[t]he district court [to] do so in the first instance.” 728 F.3d at
1051 n.3.
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suffices to make a claim justiciable.’”165 Pickup thus illustrates one
more reason that it is unclear that Perry will have effects of much
significance as far as federal court standing law, upon which Perry’s
holding was based, is concerned.
III. FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR
Unlike in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Windsor166 overcame the threshold jurisdictional issues to
reach the equal protection merits of the challenge to section 3 of the
combatively named Defense of Marriage Act.167 DOMA section 3,
recall, defines marriage as male-female for almost all federal law,
regardless of whether a state or another jurisdiction allowed a samesex couple to marry.168 On the merits, the Court in Windsor held
section 3 unconstitutional as applied to same-sex couples validly
married in states.169 Unlike Perry in another way, Windsor is likely
to have significant doctrinal repercussions, as is already becoming
apparent.
Section A of this part summarizes the Windsor litigation up
through the Supreme Court. Although it should be quite clear that the
Court’s decision invalidating section 3 of DOMA was based on equal
protection principles, Section B of this part makes the case for that
conclusion in painstaking detail in light of Justice Scalia’s contention
in dissent that the Court did not base its ruling on equal protection.
Section C of this part then considers the potential impact of Windsor
on suits seeking to make not the federal government, as in Windsor,
but rather a state recognize a same-sex couple’s marriage from
another state. Finally, Section D takes up the question of the
implications of Windsor for constitutional suits seeking to compel
states themselves to let same-sex couples marry civilly.
A. The Windsor Litigation
United States v. Windsor arose after Edie Windsor’s partner of
165. Id. at 1050 n.2 (quoting Brown v. City of Los Angeles, 521 F.3d 1238, 1240 n.1 (9th Cir.
2008) (per curiam)).
166. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
167. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199 § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
168. See id. and note 5 and accompanying text supra.
169. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96.
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forty-four years and wife, Thea Spyer, died.170 They had been legally
married in Canada after four decades together,171 and the law of their
home state of New York recognized their marriage.172 If the federal
government had done likewise, Edie would have qualified for the
surviving spouse tax exemption from the federal estate tax; however,
because section 3 of DOMA denied federal recognition of their
marriage, the government insisted that Edie pay the Treasury
$363,053.173 She challenged this treatment as denying her the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.174
After U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that he and
President Barack Obama had concluded that Windsor’s contention
was correct—that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional as
applied to validly married same-sex couples—and that the
Department of Justice would not defend Edie’s lawsuit,175 the House
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group intervened to defend the law,
acting on a three-to-two party-line vote (with the Republicans voting
to defend DOMA and the Democrats voting against doing so).176
The federal district court in Windsor held that section 3 was
unconstitutional.177 The administration declined to provide Windsor
her tax refund, even though it believed her legal position correct.
Rather, both BLAG and the Justice Department appealed the
170. “Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer shared their lives together as a committed couple for 44
years. They became a couple in 1965, got engaged in 1967, and married in Canada in 2007, after
it became legal . . . . Thea died in 2009 . . . .” Windsor v. United States—Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQ), AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/windsor
-v-united-states-frequently-asked-questions-faq (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
171. See id.
172. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169, 177–78 (2d
Cir. 2012)).
173. Id.
174. Id. Because the defendant was the federal government, the suit relied on the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to state and local government, as
discussed below.
175. Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of
Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag
-223.html.
176. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction at 2-3, United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (timing and vote); David Baumann, The
Defense of Marriage Act, U.S. Politics, ABOUT.COM, http://uspolitics.about.com/od/gaymarriage
/a/The-Defense-Of-Marriage-Act.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (noting party-line vote split).
Later a majority of the House of Representatives voted to authorize the continued defense of
section 3.
177. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
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decision, the latter not seeking reversal but affirmance. While the
case was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the Justice Department filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
before judgment in the case, which Windsor agreed the Supreme
Court should grant but which BLAG opposed. Before the Court
acted on that petition, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court.178
Strikingly, alone among current court of appeals cases, it held that
sexual orientation is a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny
and that DOMA section 3 could not satisfy such scrutiny.179 The
administration then asked the Court to treat its request as a regular
certiorari petition (not one requesting unusual review before the
lower court ruled).
The Supreme Court granted the administration’s petition for
certiorari, but the Court also directed the parties to brief whether
there was a proper case for it to decide in light of the
administration’s agreement with Edie Windsor that DOMA section 3
was unconstitutional. After hearing argument, the Court concluded
that there was a proper case or controversy before it180 and that
section 3 was indeed unconstitutional.181 The ruling was five-to-four,
with the Court’s more liberal justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and
Sotomayor) joining Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion.182 Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas (in opinions by the
Chief Justice and Justice Scalia) concluded that there was not a
proper case before the Court, and that even if there were, DOMA
section 3 did not violate the Constitution’s equality guarantees.
Justice Alito thought that BLAG had standing to bring the case, but
agreed with the other dissenters that DOMA section 3 was
constitutional.183
Despite expressing skepticism about the Executive’s decision
not to defend the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA,184 the
178. Id.
179. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
180. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680.
181. Id. at 2693, 2696.
182. Id. at 2681.
183. Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
and in Part I by Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2711–12 (Alito, J., joined in parts II and III by
Thomas, J.).
184. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court characterized the attorney general’s letter
announcing that the president had determined section 3 to be unconstitutional and refusing to
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Windsor majority concluded that “[i]n this case the United States
retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on appeal
and in proceedings before this Court” despite the government’s
position on DOMA’s unconstitutionality.185 The Court accepted that
the obligation to pay Windsor’s tax refund counts as an injury,
whether or not the government agrees that it was legally obliged to
pay, and that “Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the United
States refuses to pay thus establishes a controversy sufficient for
Article III jurisdiction.”186 To the extent that the posture of the case
raised prudential concerns, the Court held them allayed by BLAG’s
substantive defense of section 3 and the importance of resolving the
question of the constitutionality of this federal law,187 and so the
Court concluded that “the prudential . . . requirements” of standing
were met.188
On the merits, a majority of the Court agreed with the United
States and Edie Windsor that section 3 of DOMA was
defend its constitutionality as “reflect[ing] the Executive’s own conclusion, relying on a
definition still being debated and considered in the courts, that heightened equal protection
scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
at 2683–84. And in further addressing the standing issue, the Court wrote: “The Executive’s
failure to defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress based on a constitutional theory not
yet established in judicial decisions has created a procedural dilemma.” Id. at 2688. This “wait for
us” approach to constitutional interpretation has little to commend it in this context, where the
president and attorney general had faithfully applied the Court’s own precedents addressing the
factors bearing on heightened scrutiny and reached a conclusion in accord with the great weight
of scholarly analysis. (This is not just my sense of the literature. An earlier survey of
constitutional scholarship on marriage rights of same-sex couples published found that sixty-nine
“of seventy-two articles, notes, comments, or essays focusing primarily on same-sex
marriage . . . . advocated, supported, or were generally sympathetic to same-sex marriage.” Lynn
D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 1, 18, 20. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding,
Democracy, and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951, 964 (2010) (concluding that
“opposition to DOMA within the legal academy has also been strong and consistent and seems to
be increasing”).
185. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2687–89. Because the Court did not hold that BLAG had independent standing to
defend DOMA, Windsor need not be seen as blessing an interference with separation of powers (a
committee of one House of Congress defending a federal law, rather than the executive branch
defending it) of a kind that might seem akin to that in Perry (initiative proponents who were not
state officials in any branch seeking to defend the initiative in federal court, unsuccessfully given
the Court’s holding in Perry). Nor did the Court in Windsor hold that BLAG had a personal
interest in DOMA that was injured by the its nonenforcement or a judicial ruling that DOMA is
unconstitutional, so again there is no conflict with the Court’s holding in Perry that the
proponents lacked such an injury; Windsor simply did not reach BLAG’s standing.
188. Id. at 2688.
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unconstitutional.189 The Court extensively recounted the primary role
of states (rather than the federal government) in regulating “domestic
relations” including marriage, an allocation of authority set aside by
section 3.190 Rather than address “whether this federal intrusion on
state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the
federal balance,”191 the Court treated the “unusual character” of the
discrimination wrought by DOMA as a reason to give “careful
consideration” to the question of its constitutionality.192 And the
Court did so, noting the broad sweep of DOMA’s section 3,193
recounting prejudice expressed in DOMA’s legislative history,194 and
detailing some of the wide range of economic and dignitary harms
Section 3 inflicted on married same-sex couples.195
B. The Doctrinal Basis for Kennedy’s Opinion of the Court
As he did in the Supreme Court’s two other major decisions
widely seen as “gay rights” cases, Romer v. Evans196 and Lawrence
v. Texas,197 Justice Anthony Kennedy again wrote for the Court in
United States v. Windsor. Joined by the Court’s four more liberal
Justices,198 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that section 3 of
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act,199 which sought to exclude
same-sex couples from the definition of “marriage” and “spouse” for
all federal laws,200 was unconstitutional. Contrary to protestations of
189. Id. at 2693, 2696.
190. Id. at 2689–92.
191. Id. at 2692.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2694 (“DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code . . . . Among
the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations that DOMA controls are laws pertaining
to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits.”).
194. Id. at 2693–94. According to the Court in Windsor, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit was corrected that Congress’s “goal” with section 3 “was ‘to put a thumb on the scales
and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its marriage laws.’” Id. at 2693 (quoting
Massachusetts v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 682 F. 3d 1, 12–13 (1st Cir.
2012)).
195. Id. at 2694–95.
196. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
197. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
198. Specifically, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor joined Justice Kennedy’s
opinion.
199. Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419, (codified as amended at 1 U. S. C. § 7 (2013)).
200. Section 3 of DOMA amended the federal Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §7, to restrictively
provide that, regardless of state law,
in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
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bafflement in Justice Scalia’s obstreperous dissent,201 the Windsor
majority opinion clearly relied on the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee
of equal protection of the laws, as explained in the first subsection
below.202 Scalia’s slightly better point, however, addressed in the
next section, was that the significance of federalism in the Court’s
opinion was underspecified. Indeed, Justice Scalia disparages the
majority’s rationale for its possible reliance on “some amorphous
federalism component”203—a point taken up in the second subsection
following.204
1. Equal Protection at Its Core
Pace Justice Scalia, it should be beyond dispute that the Court’s
opinion in Windsor was predicated on equal protection principles;
after all, the Court expressly stated that DOMA “violates basic . . .
equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”205
I nevertheless make the point here, at some length, in an effort to
steer lower federal and state courts away from the confusion Scalia is
seemingly trying to sow. First, the sole question presented in the U.S.
government’s petition for certiorari in Windsor was “[w]hether
Section 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex
who are legally married under the laws of their State.”206 Since the
Supreme Court is only supposed to decide that question or subsidiary
questions “fairly included therein,”207 the Court would have strayed
far from its officially approved practice if it did not address that
equal protection question.
Second, in turning to the merits of the constitutional challenge,
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.
Id.
201. See infra Part III.B.2.
202. See infra Part III.B.1.
203. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. See infra Part III.B.2.
205. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (majority opinion). I discuss this language, and what the
ellipsis replaces, at text accompanying note 227 infra.
206. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at i, United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
207. Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a).
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after recounting the basic facts of Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer’s
wedding the Court’s opinion “conclude[d] that, until recent years,
many citizens had not even considered the possibility that two
persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and
dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage.”208 This
language of “occupy[ing] the same status and dignity” sounds in
equal protection, a constitutional protection which the Court’s earlier
opinion in Romer v. Evans209 suggested is suspicious of “status-based
enactment[s]” or “a classification of persons undertaken for its own
sake.”210 Although only a minority of states allowed same-sex
couples to marry,211 the Court understood those states to have
“decided that same-sex couples should have the right to marry and so
live with pride in themselves and their union and in a status of
equality with all other married persons.”212 When the Court’s opinion
turned to analyzing section 3’s constitutionality, the Court observed
that “its operation is directed to a class of persons that the laws of
New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to protect.”213 This
discussion about “a class of persons” is likewise language of equal
protection, which has long been understood to prohibit “class
legislation”214 and whose constitutional doctrine focuses on the

208. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
209. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
210. See id. at 635.
211. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (“New York, in common with, as of this writing, 11
other States and the District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the right to
marry . . . .”); Same-Sex Marriage: Developments in the Law, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal
-encyclopedia/same-sex-marriage-developments-the-law.html (“After a long, drawn-out marriage
equality battle, California became the 13th state to recognize same-sex marriage.”) (last updated
Dec. 5, 2013); Kate Zernika & Marc Santora, As Gays Wed in New Jersey, Christie Ends Court
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/nyregion/christiewithdraws-appeal-of-same-sex-marriage-ruling-in-new-jersey.html (“His decision not to appeal a
judge’s ruling that allowed the weddings removed the last hurdle to legalized same-sex marriage
in New Jersey, making it the 14th state, along with the District of Columbia, to allow gay couples
to wed.”); Courtney Subramanian, Hawaii Governor Signs Gay Marriage Bill, TIME,
http://nation.time.com/2013/11/13/hawaii-governor-signs-gay-marriage-bill/ (Nov. 13, 2013)
(“The new measure allows gay residents and tourists to wed beginning Dec. 2, adding to the 14
states and District of Columbia where same sex marriage is legal.”); Dana Davidsen, Illinois
Becomes 16th State to Allow Same-sex Marriage, CNN (Nov. 20, 2013),
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/11/20/illinois-becomes-16th-state-to-allow-same-sexmarriage/ (“The measure will go into effect June 14, 2014.”).
212. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2960 (emphasis added).
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Cruz, supra note 38.
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“classification” embodied in challenged government action.215
The Court continued its focus on inequality when it observed
that “DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the incidents,
benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married
couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to
constitutional guarantees, from one state to the next.”216 Viewed this
way, DOMA’s discrimination was unusual, and the Court had
affirmed in Romer v. Evans,217 quoting Louisville Gas and Electric
Co. v. Coleman,218 that “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character
especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they
are obnoxious to the constitutional provision[.]”219 “[T]he
constitutional provision” at issue in Romer and Louisville Gas &
Electric Co. was the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,220 again showing that Windsor is an equal protection
decision.
Of course, the Equal Protection Clause does not by its terms
apply to the federal government; rather, it provides that “[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”221 Where the federal government is
concerned, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is the
primary textual home of the Constitution’s guarantee of
constitutional equality, as the Court’s doctrine for decades has
recognized.222 As the Court said in Brown v. Board of Education’s
companion case Bolling v. Sharpe,223 “discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”224 That is, certain
unequal treatment deprives people of liberty (or property or even life,
one might suppose) without due process of law. This doctrinal
215. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Affirmative Action and the “Individual” Right to Equal
Protection, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 241, 245–63 (2009) (addressing “The Supreme Court Precedents
on Equality as a Limit on Governmental Classification”).
216. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (emphasis added).
217. 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
218. 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928).
219. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
220. Id. at 631; Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 227 U.S. at 36.
221. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
222. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
223. Bolling, 347 U.S. 497.
224. Id. at 499 (condemning racial school segregation by the District of Columbia, a federal
governmental entity).
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guarantee is commonly known as “the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause” of the Fifth Amendment.225
That is why the Court’s opinion in Windsor says that the case
requires the Court “to address whether the resulting injury and
indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected
by the Fifth Amendment.”226 Because the federal government is
subjected to equal protection commands through the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Windsor opinion’s declaration
that DOMA “violates basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government”227 should be
unexceptionable. When the Supreme Court criticized DOMA
because it “seeks to injure” same-sex couples married under state
law, the Court repeated its forty-year-old conclusion that “[t]he
Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that
a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”228 This invocation
of “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality” clearly signals that
equal protection was doing the work here, as does the Court’s focus
on “disparate treatment,” a core equal protection concern.229
Moreover, the case that articulated this principle quoted in Windsor,
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,230 was one in which the Court
held a federal law violated the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment (as Justice Scalia acknowledges in his Windsor
dissent).231
The Court in Windsor explained the deficiencies of section 3 in
terms that should leave no room for doubt that the Court held that the
law violates equal protection principles. In discussing the breadth of
the law, the Court observed that “DOMA writes inequality into the
entire United States Code.”232 The Court identified section 3’s
purpose and effects with inequality: “DOMA’s principal effect is to
225. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009); see, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2706 n.5 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 533 (1973)).
226. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (majority opinion).
227. Id. at 2693.
228. Id. (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35).
229. Id.
230. 413 U. S. 528 (1973).
231. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 2694.
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identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them
unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality. . . .”233
When the Windsor Court concluded that it must “hold, as it now
does, that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of
the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution[,]”234 the Court was invoking the Constitution’s equal
protection obligation on the federal government.235 The very next
sentence of the opinion explained unequivocally that “[t]he liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains
within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal
protection of the laws.”236 In support of this contention, the Windsor
opinion cited Bolling v. Sharpe,237 the first Supreme Court case that
expressly held there to be an equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, which held that the equal protection standard applicable
to the federal government under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is coextensive with the equal protection standard
applicable to the states through the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.238
All the preceding might sound like overkill to establish the
obvious meaning of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in
Windsor. What warrants the extended explication is that Justice
Scalia purported to be perplexed239 by the majority’s statement that
“[w]hile the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the
power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth
Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood
and preserved.”240 “The only possible interpretation of this
statement,” Scalia asserted, “is that the Equal Protection Clause, even
the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated in the Due Process
Clause, is not the basis for today’s holding.”241 Scalia did not offer
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id. at 2695.
Id.
Id.
347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954).
515 U.S. 200, 217–218 (1995).
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2695 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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any explanation for why he interpreted the Court’s sentence in the
counterintuitive way that he did, perhaps because there is no
legitimate explanation.
The Court forthrightly stated in the first half of its sentence
under discussion here that the Fifth Amendment rendered section 3
of DOMA unconstitutional.242 That first half of the sentence neither
expressly asserted nor denied that it is the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of that amendment which
rendered section 3 unconstitutional.243 But the second half of the
contested sentence is entirely consistent with this Article’s foregoing
equal protection analysis. In saying that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause makes the Fifth Amendment
right against such stigmatizing class legislation more specific,
comprehended, and meaningful, the Court is simply echoing what
the Supreme Court said in Bolling v. Sharpe back in 1954: “The
‘equal protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of law,’ . . . [b]ut, as this
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.”244 As scholars including Akhil Amar have
recognized, one function of the later-enacted Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is to clarify the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.245 And as for the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s specification of the equal protection mandate makes
the right to due process better understood and protected, recall Chief
Justice Marshall’s words for the Court in Marbury v. Madison: “The
powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is
written.”246
The only potentially real question is not whether equal
protection undergirds the Court’s holding in Windsor, but whether
the opinion also rests on substantive due process protection of liberty
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
245. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 772 (1999) (“[F]or
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the words of its Equal Protection Clause
were not expressing a different idea than the words of the Due Process Clause but were
elaborating the same idea: the Equal Protection Clause was in part a clarifying gloss on the due
process idea.” (emphasis omitted)).
246. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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and perhaps fundamental rights.247 Justice Scalia’s dissent, not
without reason, sees indications of “the dread” doctrine of
“substantive due process” in the majority opinion.248 He wrote:
The majority opinion . . . says that DOMA is
unconstitutional as “a deprivation of the liberty of the
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution[]”; that it violates “basic due process”
principles; and that it inflicts an “injury and indignity” of a
kind that denies “an essential part of the liberty protected by
the Fifth Amendment.”249
“And,” Windsor stated, “though Congress has great authority to
design laws to fit its own conception of sound national policy, it
cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”250
Although there are coherent arguments that Windsor only used
substantive due process’s fundamental right to marry to inform an
analysis grounded squarely in equal protection doctrine,251 marriage
equality litigation has already relied on Windsor in suits pressing not
just equal protection claims but also substantive due
process/fundamental rights claims. In Pennsylvania, for example, the
ACLU is suing the state, arguing that its refusal to let same-sex
couples marry and its refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex
couples validly entered in other states are unconstitutional.252 The
ACLU253 argues that “Pennsylvania’s exclusion of same-sex couples
247. See, e.g., Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, not “Argle
Bargle”: The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17, 25
(arguing that Windsor is an “equal liberty” case that “unif[ies] principles of equal protection and
liberty”) (2014).
248. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 2706 (citations omitted) (quoting majority opinion at 2695, 2693, and 2692,
respectively).
250. Id. at 2695 (majority opinion).
251. See Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 220, 230
(2013) (concluding that Windsor “is conceptually, if not doctrinally, a right-to-marry case” but
that “Justice Kennedy’s opinion ultimately rests on equal protection grounds”).
252. See Whitewood v. Corbett, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (July 11, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/whitewood-v-corbett. Although I served as a board-elected
general counsel for the national ACLU during some of the period of the preparation of this
Article, I did not participate in the Whitewood litigation. See also Complaint, Paladino v. Corbett,
No. 2:13-cv-5641 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2013) (seeking recognition by Pennsylvania of marriage
same-sex couple entered in Massachusetts).
253. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Whitewood v. Corbett, No. 1-13-
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from marriage infringes on the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”254 Independently of the discrimination argument under
the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs argue that Pennsylvania’s
denial of marriage to same-sex couples should be held to strict
scrutiny “because it burdens the fundamental right to marry.”255 Most
of the complaint does not differentiate between the equal protection
and due process claims.256 Thus, the introduction of the complaint
argues that “[t]he exclusion from marriage undermines the plaintiff
couples’ ability to achieve their life goals and dreams, threatens their
mutual economic stability, and denies them,” here quoting Windsor,
“‘a dignity and status of immense import.’”257
More dramatically, at least one complaint as of the initial
writing of this Article appears to have already interpreted Windsor to
mean that the Due Process Clause’s substantive protection of
“liberty” embraces same-sex couples’ freedom to marry.258 In Griego
v. Oliver,259 six couples challenged New Mexico’s refusal to allow
same-sex couples to marry civilly or to recognize same-sex couples’
marriages validly entered in other jurisdictions.260 In seeking
(ultimately unsuccessfully)261 a writ of mandamus from the New
Mexico Supreme Court to shorten the litigation, the Griego plaintiffs
relied on federal precedent to argue that “[b]arring same-sex couples
cv-01861-1 (filed July 9, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/whitewood
_v._corbett_--_complaint.pdf.
254. Id. ¶ 15, at 5.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. ¶ 10 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
258. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Griego v. Oliver, No.
D-202-CV-2013-02757, 2013 WL 4879250, at *1 (D. N.M. Aug. 21, 2013).
259. Griego v. Oliver, No. D-202-CV-2013-02757, 2013 WL 4716361 (D. N.M. Aug. 26,
2013). The New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the
marriage non-recognition laws violated the state constitution’s equal protection clause. Griego v.
Oliver, 316 P.2d 865 (N.M. 2013).
260. I should note that I am close friends with one of the plaintiff couples who sought
recognition of an extraterritorially entered marriage.
261. See Steve Terrell, NM High Court Won't Immediately Hear Marriage Equality Cases,
ROUNDHOUSE ROUNDUP: THE BLOG, http://roundhouseroundup.blogspot.com/2013/08/nm-highcourt-wont-immediately-hear.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2006) (reporting denial without prejudice
of petition for writ of mandamus in Griego v. Oliver); Order, Hanna v. Salazar, No. 34,216 (N.M.
Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/160797573/NM-SUPREME-ORDER
-DENYING-IMMEDIATE-CONSIDERATION-of-SAME-SEX-MARRIAGE-CASES (last
visited Aug. 28, 2013) (denying without prejudice petition for writ of mandamus).
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from marriage violates New Mexico’s due process guarantee by
depriving them of the fundamental right to marry.”262 In arguing that
“denying recognition to same-sex couples who legally married in
another jurisdiction would . . . violate their right to due process under
the New Mexico Constitution,” the Griego plaintiffs read Windsor to
have “specifically held that married same-sex couples who are
legally married under state law have a protected liberty interest in
their marriage under the federal Due Process Clause.”263 The
language they quoted from Windsor? “DOMA is unconstitutional as
a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution.”264
The Supreme Court undeniably said that. And it is one of the
passages to which Justice Scalia pointed in accusing the Court of
relying on substantive due process to invalidate section 3 of
DOMA.265 Scalia may have made this interpretive claim in order to
further his apparent desire to minimize the import of Windsor,
expecting that “lower federal courts and state courts can distinguish
today’s case when the issue before them is state denial of marital
status to same-sex couples”266 and exhorting them to do so.267 Yet I
have already explained why the Court’s language is best understood
as reflecting reliance on the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Ironically, then, in light of the
Griego plaintiffs’ use of Windsor to support a substantive libertybased (as distinguished from equality-based) argument against
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage, Scalia’s studied
obtuseness, which had him denying that the Court’s holding rested
on equal protection and suggesting that it might rest on substantive
due process, may in the lower courts actually undermine his
preferred view that the Constitution poses no obstacle to states’
262. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 20, Griego v. Oliver, No. D-202-CV-2013
-02757, 2013 WL 4879250) (July 2, 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/151566993
/New-Mexico-Supreme-Court-Writ-of-Mandamus (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
263. Id. at 23 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013)).
264. Id. at 23 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680).
265. See supra text accompanying footnote 264–265.
266. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. See id. (avowing that “an opinion with such scatter-shot rationales as this one . . . can be
distinguished in many ways,” opining that the majority’s opinion “deserves to be” so
distinguished, and bluntly concluding that “[s]tate and lower federal courts should take the Court
at its word and distinguish away”).
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excluding same-sex couples from marriage.
2. “Amorphous Federalism” in the Court’s Reasoning
Justice Scalia’s grousing about the role of federalism in the
Windsor majority opinion is not as baseless as his denial that the
opinion rests on equal protection principles. He questioned why the
majority opinion continued to advert to “the usual tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” even after it
“formally disclaimed reliance upon principles of federalism.”268 At
the end of the day, for Scalia, “[t]he sum of all the Court’s
nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equalprotection grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and
perhaps with some amorphous federalism component playing a
role). . . .”269 While there is some merit to his concerns, I do not think
the Court’s deployment of federalism is as indistinct as Justice Scalia
suggests.
One could certainly envision an opinion relying on federalism as
a factor of unspecified weight and/or unclear doctrinal significance.
The Court could have relied on the fact that DOMA section 3
regulates marriage, part of domestic relations, which is “one of the
still paradigmatic cases of matters said to lie properly with the
states.”270 That fact could have been said to “weigh against” the
constitutionality of the law, without the Court ever attempting to
quantify such weight.271 I myself previously sketched what such an
“uncategorical” treatment of federalism objections to DOMA section
3 might look like.272 The regulation of “domestic relations” could
have been just one of a series of unquantified (or “amorphous,” in

268. Id. at 2705 (quoting majority opinion at 2693).
269. Id. at 2707. This concession of the possibility of an equal protection basis for the Court’s
holding in Windsor contradicts Scalia’s earlier assertion that “the Equal Protection Clause, even
the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated in the Due Process Clause, is not the basis for today’s
holding.” Id. at 2706.
270. David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism, 19 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 805, 817 (2011).
271. Cf. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (criticizing notion of interest “balancing” because “the interests on both sides are
incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock
is heavy”).
272. See Cruz, supra note 270, at 814–27 (identifying several factors that collectively might
be taken to render DOMA section 3 unconstitutional on federalism grounds).
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Scalia’s parlance273) factors informing a judgment that section 3 was
unconstitutional: It was a federal law that operates in the core of the
field of domestic relations, an arena historically and to this day still
frequently said to be the near-exclusive preserve of state authority.274
It operated, not in discrete operational settings carefully judged by
Congress to require federal displacement of state law definitions of
marital status, but across the board in virtually any area in which the
federal government acts.275 It purported to be a definitional statute,
but it selectively excluded married couples (of the same-sex) who are
in fact married under state laws that the federal government
otherwise uses for determining people’s marital status, thus casting
egalitarian state laws and couples who have taken advantage of them
in a false light.276 But that is not how the Court in Windsor treated
federalism.
The Windsor opinion recounted the process whereby New York
and some other states “concluded that same-sex marriage ought to be
given recognition and validity in the law for those same-sex couples
who wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other”
because the mixed-sex requirement for civil marriage “came to be
seen [there] as an unjust exclusion.”277 Then, the Court in Windsor
asserted that as the “beginning point” for deciding whether section 3
was unconstitutional it should consider “the design, purpose, and
effect of DOMA . . . [a]gainst this background of lawful same-sex
marriage in some states.”278 Thus, the Court in its initial brush with
federalism in Windsor suggested that the legal landscape provides
important context against which to assess the structure, intent, and
consequences of section 3 of DOMA. This suggestion is completely
unexceptional.
“By history and tradition the definition and regulation of
marriage,” the Court next summarized, “has been treated as being
within the authority and realm of the separate States.”279 At the same
time, the federal government had over time adopted laws “that bear
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Cruz, supra note 270, at 827.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
Id.
Id. at 2689–90.
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on marital rights and privileges” or “affect marriages and family
status.”280 Governmental authority over civil marriage thus had been
shared between federal and state governments, so the Court was not
saying that merely touching on domestic relations made section 3 of
DOMA unconstitutional. Yet DOMA appeared to the Court different
from earlier federal actions where Congress enacted “discrete
statutes” or somewhat narrowly “limited federal laws” to further
constitutionally permissible federal policies.281 Thus, section 3’s
constitutionality cannot be taken for granted but must be analyzed.
DOMA’s applicability to nearly the entirety of federal law appears
against this background as an “intervention” in the usual distribution
of marriage regulations.282
“In order to assess the validity of that intervention,” the Court
maintained, “it is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power
and authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition.”283
This pronunciamento seems to be key to Justice Scalia’s objections.
For after providing what Scalia counts as “seven full pages about the
traditional power of States to define domestic relations,”284 the
majority opinion concluded that “it is unnecessary to decide whether
this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution
because it disrupts the federal balance.”285 Because Scalia thought
that “no one questions the power of the states to define marriage
(with the concomitant conferral of dignity and status),” he could not
see “the point of devoting seven pages to describing how long and
well established that power is[.]”286
But whether contested or not, the pedigree and breadth of state
authority over marriage, and domestic relations more generally, is
280. Id. at 2690.
281. Id.; cf. Cruz, supra note 270, at 822 (“With the enactment of section 3 of DOMA,
Congress created a type of federal family law that is very different from the definitional sections
of individual statutes, which apply only within the boundaries of those statutes.”).
282. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 2692 (majority opinion).
286. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He means of course, as does the majority, see id. at
2691 (majority opinion) (“State laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect the
constitutional rights of persons . . . .”) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)), that no one
disputes that states generally have authority to define civil marriage, even though the Constitution
makes certain definitions impermissible. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 2 (holding restrictions on
interracial marriages unconstitutional).
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relevant on the majority’s terms, terms that are quite comprehensible
within conventional equal protection doctrine, without recourse to
the kind of “amorphous federalism” that Scalia took the Court to be
arguing. In particular, as the Court went on to explain, the
deep-rootedness of state (rather than federal) authority over marriage
serves an evidentiary function.287 DOMA section 3 is unusual in that
it “rejects the long established precept that the incidents, benefits,
and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples
within each State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional
guarantees, from one State to the next.”288 And as noted above, the
Court said again that “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character
especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they
are obnoxious to [equal protection].”289 Since “DOMA, because of
its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of
reliance on state law to define marriage[,]”290 the Court should be
understood to believe DOMA more likely reflects animus against
same-sex couples than would a federal law that adhered to the more
usual allocation of governmental authority.291 In the Windsor
majority’s own words,
the responsibility of the States for the regulation of
domestic relations is an important indicator of the
substantial societal impact the State’s classifications have in
the daily lives and customs of its people. DOMA’s unusual
deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and
accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to
deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and
responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of
their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.292
This evidentiary inference is plausible, and more plausible than
287. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (majority opinion).
288. Id.
289. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See quoted text accompanying note 219 supra.
290. Id.
291. See id. at 2693 (“In determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus or
purpose, discriminations of an unusual character especially require careful consideration.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
292. Id. The Court does not state that this deviation is the sole evidence of animus, and it
discussed other evidence at id. at 2693–95. I do not address that evidence here because I am
focusing on the role of federalism in the Court’s analysis.
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others enshrined in the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence.293 If a particular tradition allocating authority to the
states is both broad and deep, one might expect that the federal
government would have powerful reasons before it derogates from it.
In order to determine whether the United States has such reasons,
courts must give the challenged, unusual law “careful consideration”;
otherwise, if the lenient rational basis review typically applied to
economic regulations were used, the Court would only assess
whether the law has the most tenuous conceivable connection to
some merely legitimate governmental purpose. Without looking for
more persuasive justifications for the deviation, a reviewing court
might not be able to tell whether or not the deviant policy is
grounded in animus or instead justified by public-regarding
purposes. This, at any rate, is the “smoking out” rationale of strict
scrutiny, which holds that strict scrutiny is necessary for courts to
determine whether particular governmental uses of race are
“compelling.”294
Of course, racial classifications receive strict scrutiny under
current equal protection doctrine, and the Court has not specified the
level of scrutiny applicable to sexual orientation discrimination.295
As Justice Scalia noted in his Windsor dissent, the majority “opinion
293. Consider, for example, the Court’s argument in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1996). There, in the course of holding that Congress lacked the ability to use its Article I powers
to “commandeer” state or local law enforcement officials to enforce federal programs, Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion argued that “if . . . earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly
attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist.” Id. at
905. In reality, as Justice Stevens’s dissent explained, “[t]he Court’s evaluation of the historical
evidence . . . fails to acknowledge the important difference between policy decisions that may
have been influenced by respect for state sovereignty concerns, and decisions that are compelled
by the Constitution.” Id. at 952–53 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting). “Indeed, an entirely appropriate concern for the prerogatives of state government
readily explains Congress’ sparing use of this otherwise ‘highly attractive’ . . . power. Congress’
discretion, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, indicates not that the power does not exist, but
rather that the interests of the States are more than sufficiently protected by their participation in
the National Government.” Id. at 953 n.12.
294. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
295. Were discrimination against same-sex couples recognized as a form of sex
discrimination, see, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay
Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the
Sex Discrimination Argument for Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519
(2001); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER (2007),
which it is, extant doctrine would call for heightened or intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996).
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does not resolve and indeed does not even mention what had been
the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal
Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman
are reviewed for more than mere rationality.”296 So, it may be that, if
DOMA’s deviation from the historical exercises of governmental
authority over marriage is relevant for the animus- or purpose-based
reason just sketched, Windsor may in the future be best understood
as employing a form of heightened scrutiny.297 That is, by using an
unspecified form of scrutiny to “smoke out” the anti-lesbigay animus
behind DOMA, Windsor may seem (as Scalia charged) to apply
something more akin to heightened scrutiny than rational basis
review, and so may come to stand for the proposition that equal
protection demands heightened scrutiny when the government
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.
C. Windsor and Interstate Recognition of Marriages
Among the marriage-related issues that Windsor does not
expressly address is whether it is constitutional for a state to refuse to
recognize a same-sex couple’s marriage from another state or
country. This is distinct from the issue of whether a state must itself
allow same-sex couples to marry, which the next section addresses. It
is a question that, like virtually all litigated constitutional issues,298
will ultimately not be answered solely by logic; rather, the meaning
of Windsor for questions of interstate recognition will unfold with
experience and time. But not necessarily a lot of time and experience.
On July 11, 2013, fifteen days after the Supreme Court decided the

296. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297. Accord id. (“But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that
deferential framework [i.e., rational basis review].”). This observation might be compared to
Justice Scalia’s criticism of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003). There, she concluded that Texas’s law criminalizing oral and anal sex, when
engaged in by two people of the same sex, failed “a more searching form of rational basis
review . . . under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Scalia criticized Justice O’Connor’s standard as unprecedented and
underspecified, id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and suggested it must mean at a minimum that if
a law did “exhibit a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, it would be unconstitutional
even if it had a rational basis.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That would be more
stringent judicial review than that ordinarily understood to be mandated under the rational basis
standard.
298. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.”).
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marriage cases, Ohio residents James Obergefell and John Arthur
flew to Maryland to be married, since Ohio law neither allows nor
recognizes marriages of same-sex couples.299 After returning to
Ohio, they filed suit against Ohio’s governor and other defendants on
July 19.300 Arthur was terminally ill,301 and the suit sought to ensure
that the state would recognize their Maryland marriage so that when
it came time to issue a death certificate, it would list Arthur’s marital
status as “married” and record Obergefell as his surviving spouse.302
The ACLU filed similar suits seeking to use equal protection to
compel interstate recognition of valid marriages of same-sex couples,
as well as an affirmative right to marry in the state, in New
Mexico303 and Pennsylvania.304 On Obergfell and Arthur’s request
for a temporary restraining order, the judge relied on Windsor to
conclude that they showed a strong likelihood that they would prove
that failure to recognize their marriage for purposes of the death
certificate would violate equal protection.305 (Although Arthur died
after receiving preliminary injunctive relief,306 an amended
complaint added a funeral director bringing claims on behalf of
same-sex couples, and the district court rejected the government’s
attempt to have the case dismissed after Arthur’s death.307)
Unlike the federal government, state governments historically
299. Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 22,
2013).
300. Verified Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2013),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/155109542/1-13-cv-00501-1.
301. See id. at 2 (characterizing Arthur as a “hospice patient” “suffer[ing] from debilitating
ALS disease”); id. at 6 (noting that “John is likely to die soon”).
302. Id. at 6.
303. Complaint, Griego v. Oliver, No. D-202-CV-201302757 (D. N.M. Mar. 21, 2013),
available at https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/griego-v-oliver; see also Second Amended
Complaint, Griego v. Oliver, No. D-202-CV-201302757 (D. N.M. Aug. 21, 2013).
304. Complaint, Whitewood v. Corbett, No.13-1861-JE, (M.D. Pa. July 9, 2013); see also
ACLU Seeks Freedom to Marry for Pennsylvania Couples, ACLU (July 9, 2013), https://www
.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/aclu-seeks-freedom-marry-pennsylvania-couples. Cf. Complaint, Palladino v.
Corbett,
No.
2:13-cv-5641-MAM
(E.D.
Pa.
Sept. 26,
2013),
available
at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-PA-0013-0001.pdf (same-sex couple’s interstate
recognition suit filed by private counsel).
305. Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *4–5, *7 (S.D. Ohio
July 22, 2013).
306. Julie Zimmerman, John Arthur, Who Challenged Same-Sex Marriage Ban, Has Died,
CINCINATTI.COM (Oct. 22, 2013), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20131022/NEWS0104
/310220031/.
307. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 2013 WL 5934007 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2013).
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regulated marriage and decided, subject to constitutional restrictions,
which marriages from other jurisdictions to recognize.308 Therefore,
the Ohio court could have distinguished Windsor on that basis.
Instead, the judge concluded that Ohio’s action was in its own way
unprecedented, much as the federal marriage exclusion in DOMA
was unprecedented.309 Historically, Ohio treated as valid any
marriages that were valid where entered, even if Ohio would not
itself let such a couple marry.310 Thus, Ohio will recognize a
different-sex marriage of a minor311 or of first cousins.312 Apparently
the only couples whose validly entered marriages it will categorically
not recognize are same-sex couples.313 As with DOMA in Windsor,
the court here said that the only purpose such discriminatory
government action served was to impose inequality and make gay
people unequal under law, an impermissible purpose, and it was
therefore probably unconstitutional.314
This reasoning will not be persuasive to everyone. In his
Windsor dissent, Chief Justice Roberts saw nothing suspicious in
Congress’s generally accepting the validity of marriages approved by
states—even where states adopted different eligibility criteria—but
carving out an exception to this recognition where the sex of the
parties to a marriage was not to Congress’s liking:
[N]one of those prior state-by-state variations [accepted by
Congress] had involved differences over something—as the
majority puts it—“thought of by most people as essential to
the very definition of [marriage] and to its role and function
throughout the history of civilization.” That the Federal
Government treated this fundamental question differently
than it treated variations over consanguinity or minimum
308. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013); Obergefell, 2013 WL
3814262, at *5.
309. See Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262, at *4–*6.
310. Id. at *5–*6.
311. Id. at *5.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., id. at *4–*5; State Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order, Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262 (No. 1:13-CV-501), available
at http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/ohio-officials-ordered-to-recognize-gay-couples
-marriage (not identifying any class of marriages validly entered in other jurisdictions
categorically denied recognition in Ohio other than those of same-sex couples).
314. Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262, at *6, available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp
-content/uploads/2013/07/Judge-Black-ruling-on-marriage-7-22.pdf.
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age is hardly surprising . . . .315
Likewise, the National Review published commentary on the
Obergefell ruling in which Ed Whelan jumped from Windsor’s
recognition that “[e]ach state as a sovereign has a rightful and
legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within
its borders”316 to a supposed corollary “that a state, in determining
which out-of-state marriages to recognize, has broad authority to
regard some components of marriage as essential and others as
incidental[,]”317 and then to the conclusion that “[t]here is . . . no
inconsistency between Ohio’s general practice of regarding age of
consent and degrees of consanguinity as (within certain bounds)
incidental and its view that the male-female component of marriage
is essential.”318 And absent any treatment of same-sex couples he
would recognize as inconsistent with Ohio’s treatment of other
couples, Whelan presumably saw nothing suspicious about the
state’s specifically targeted denial of recognition of same-sex
couples’ marriages.
Even some supporters of marriage equality have been critical of
the district court’s reasoning in Obergefell. Steve Sanders suggested
that “[t]he opinion relied on a reading of [Windsor] that was
probably too simplistic” and criticized the judge for reasoning from
“a few soundbites from Windsor (taken out of the federalism context
Justice Kennedy was careful to provide).”319 Yet, unless one buys
into an argument like Whelan’s that marriages of same-sex couples
somehow differ “essential[ly]” from marriages of different-sex
couples (regardless of procreative capacity or lack thereof),320
Obergefell’s reasoning about the unprecedentedness of Ohio’s rule of
nonrecognition for same-sex couples’ marriages from states that

315. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 2691 (majority opinion) (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298
(1942)).
317. Ed Whelan, Federal-Court Ruling Against Ohio’s Marriage Laws, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE, http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/354422/federal-court-ruling-against
-ohios-marriage-laws-ed-whelan (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
318. Id.
319. Steve Sanders, A New Front for Marriage Equality: Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages
from Other States, ACSBLOG (July 31, 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/a-new-front-for
-marriage-equality-recognizing-same-sex- marriages-from-other-states.
320. Cf. NeJaime, supra note 251, at 223, 244 (arguing that Windsor conceptualizes marriage
in way that renders same-sex couples and different-sex couples “similarly situated”).
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allow them is strong. It parallels Windsor’s reasoning about the
unprecedentedness of DOMA’s rule of nonrecognition for same-sex
couples’ marriages from states that allow them, though of course in a
different legal context.
Sanders’s bigger concern seems to be Obergefell’s reliance on
equal protection doctrine as opposed to substantive due process.321
Sanders appeared not to like the use of equal protection here to yield
a requirement that Ohio recognize a Maryland marriage of a
same-sex couple, because the same analysis would likely also yield a
requirement that Ohio itself allow same-sex couples to marry
civilly.322 And, following incrementalist instincts, Sanders apparently
would prefer courts in the position of this one to rely on doctrines
that would be limited to interstate marriage recognition, not
full-blown equal freedom to marry, until such time as the Supreme
Court itself blesses the right to marry for same-sex couples.323
Yet, even if Sanders were correct that it would be “a much
deeper injury to your liberty, privacy and autonomy to have an
existing marriage effectively taken away from you by a state that
refuses to recognize it” than it is “to be denied the right to marry the
person you choose,”324 that would not mean that it is not also a
constitutional violation for a state to refuse to let two loving people
marry because they are of the same sex. So, it is not clear that
litigation seeking recognition of a same-sex couple’s marriage
321. Sanders, supra note 319 (“But the biggest problem, I think, is Judge Black’s use of equal
protection as the basis for the decision.”); id. (“I would locate constitutional protection for an
existing marriage in substantive and procedural due process, not equal protection.”).
322. Id. (“If Judge Black is correct . . . , then it is hard to see why it isn’t just as much of a
problem for Ohio to refuse to license same-sex marriages on equal terms with heterosexual
unions.”).
323. Id. (“[U]ntil the Supreme Court resolves the question of gay marriage for the whole
country, there are compelling reasons to distinguish between a right to get married and a separate
right to remain married.”).
324. Id. I am far from convinced that State B’s refusal to recognize a marriage from State A
effectively takes away a couple’s marriage. State A still recognizes it, as do marriage equality
states, as does the federal government and presumably the other jurisdictions in the world that
have embraced marriage equality (all of which also calls into question Sanders’s assessment of
comparative badness). Granted, State B would not be treating the couple as married, which would
have untoward consequences for the couple. Yet it is not self-evident that State A can with an
administrative act such as marrying someone confer upon a couple a right to particular legal
treatment by State B in the wide range of circumstances to which civil marriage may be legally
married. For an examination of such concerns in the different context of state decisions about
what sex a person is, see generally David B. Cruz, Sexual Judgments: Full Faith and Credit and
the Relational Character of Legal Sex, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51 (2011).
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celebrated in another state ought to eschew constitutional doctrines
that could yield a right to marry. Indeed, even Sanders’s full law
journal article on the subject concludes that at least if one accepts his
due process liberty interest in having one’s marriage recognized
(which recognition he takes as necessary for one to “remain
married”), “a state that gives recognition to heterosexual marriages
but denies it to same-sex marriages ends up with an equal protection
problem.”325 That is what Obergefell concludes, and it is an
eminently reasonable conclusion, consistent with, if not dictated by,
Windsor.
D. Windsor and State Marriage Bans
Yet another marriage-related issue not expressly resolved by
Windsor, and perhaps the biggest,326 is whether it is constitutional for
a state to refuse to let same-sex couples civilly marry in the first
instance. Windsor was about whether the federal government must
recognize marriages of same-sex couples that states had chosen to
allow. Indeed, the majority opinion in Windsor stated that “[t]his
opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.”327
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent correctly parsed the reference to
“those lawful marriages” to mean that the Court’s conclusion was
confined to the unconstitutionality of DOMA’s discrimination
against same-sex couples validly married by some state (or,
presumably, in a foreign jurisdiction).328 In his view, “[t]he Court [in
325. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 1421, 1477 (2012).
326. But see John Culhane, The Most Ingenious Attack on Gay Marriage Bans, DENVER POST
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_24225439/most-ingenious-attack-gay
-marriage-bans (arguing that while a ruling requiring interstate recognition of a same-sex couple’s
marriage differs from a ruling requiring states to let same-sex couples marry, “that will soon
become a distinction without a difference” because same-sex couples will be able to get married
in hospitable states and then have their marriage recognized in their domicile state). Culhane’s
op-ed, necessarily limited in length, does not address whether a ruling requiring interstate
recognition would apply to what conflict of laws doctrine has termed “evasive” marriages, where
domiciliaries leave a state to marry in another specifically to avoid the restrictions on marriage in
the state of domicile.
327. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
328. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). Cf. Respect for Marriage Act, H.R. 2523, 113th Cong.
(2013), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:H.R.2523: (“For the purposes of
any Federal law in which marital status is a factor, an individual shall be considered married if
that individual’s marriage is valid in the State where the marriage was entered into or, in the case
of a marriage entered into outside any State, if the marriage is valid in the place where entered
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Windsor] does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does
not decide, the distinct question whether the States, in the exercise of
their ‘historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,’
may continue to utilize the traditional definition of marriage.”329
In contrast, Justice Scalia dismissed the Windsor majority’s
express limitation as a “bald, unreasoned disclaimer.”330 In his view,
it was “easy . . . indeed . . . inevitable” that a majority on the
Supreme Court would in the future conclude that not only was
DOMA section 3 “motivated by [a] bare desire to harm” same-sex
couples, but so too were “state laws denying same-sex couples
marital status.”331 Scalia entertainingly, and perhaps helpfully from
the perspective of supporters of marriage equality, provided redlining
to show the modest changes to the majority opinion (in some cases,
nonchange) that would demonstrate the applicability of its reasoning
to the question whether state refusal to let same-sex couples marry
civilly violates the Equal Protection Clause.332 While Scalia thought
that state and lower federal courts could distinguish Windsor when
confronted with such constitutional claims,333 he was confident that
the Supreme Court would not distinguish it, but rather would extend
it: “As far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is
just a matter of listening and waiting for the other shoe [to drop].”334
If the other shoe drops in the future, as Justice Scalia put it,335
into and the marriage could have been entered into in a State.”); S. 1236, 112th Cong. (2012).
329. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 2692).
330. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice
Roberts specifically rejected this characterization, maintaining that “the disclaimer is a logical
and necessary consequence of the argument the majority has chosen to adopt.” Id. at 2697
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
332. Id. at 2709–10.
333. Id. at 2709.
334. Id. at 2710.
335. The district court in Obergefell believed that “‘the state-law shoe’ has now dropped,”
Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013)
(quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting)), because of the case before it
concerning whether the Equal Protection Clause constitutionally compelled Ohio to recognize a
same-sex couple’s marriage entered in Maryland. Because Obergefell does not in terms require
Ohio to abandon the mixed-sex requirement for marriage licenses it issues, Justice Scalia might
only consider it part of a shoe (laces, perhaps?), but the district court’s invocation of Scalia’s
dissenting trope might suggest that all of these variants of marital exclusion or non-recognition—
DOMA, interstate marriage non-recognition, and state laws limiting marriage to different-sex
couples—implicate fundamentally similar equal protection problems. I thank Doug NeJaime for
this observation.
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then perhaps the “federalism noises”336 in the Court’s opinion in
Windsor ultimately will appear not to have done much constitutional
work.337 This might be defended as an acceptable form of
temporizing,338 a way for the Supreme Court to buy time before
rendering a constitutional decision condemning the exclusion of
same-sex couples from civil marriage, time during which, if recent
history is a guide,339 it appears likely that an even larger majority of
the people of the country will come to support marriage equality.
This is unlike the Supreme Court’s making up what was and has
been generally regarded as a lawless rationale for avoiding reaching
the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans twelve years before
Loving v. Virginia.340 Here, in contrast, the Court in Windsor
provided a rationale, persuasive to the majority Justices and to me,
for why section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional. If in a future case
the Supreme Court relies on equal protection, but without any
“amorphous federalism” concerns, to strike down state laws
excluding same-sex couples from marriage, that need not mean that
the Windsor opinion was disingenuous. It could simply demonstrate

336. Id. at 2709 (“Lord, an opinion with such scatter-shot rationales as this one (federalism
noises among them) can be distinguished in many ways.”).
337. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7, 149–55 (1980) (arguing that
immutability, as distinguished from judgments about relevance or invidiousness, ultimately does
not do much work in equal protection doctrine).
338. Cf. Cruz, supra note 118, at 242–43 (suggesting permissibility of potential Supreme
Court temporizing regarding whether repealing same-sex couples’ existing right to marry under
California law was necessary for an equal protection violation because “a refusal to prejudge
cases that might arise in state with different legal histories may well be an understandable impulse
toward judicial restraint”).
339. Gallup Gay Marriage Poll Finds Majority of U.S. Citizens Would Support Nationwide
Marriage Equality Law, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/07/31/gallup-gay-marriage-poll-_n_3682884.html.
340. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), dismissed for lack of a federal question a
mandatory appeal from a state court judgment upholding Virginia’s antimiscegenation law after
the state court was unresponsive to an earlier Supreme Court decision, Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S.
891 (1955), that called for greater explanation of the state court’s ruling. For description and
critique of Naim, see David B. Cruz, Naim v. Naim, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (Paul
Finkelman ed., 2006), available at http://american-civil-liberties.com/cases/4184-naim-v-naim875-e-2nd-749-va-1955-350-us-891-1955-350-us-985-1956.html; Richard Delgado, The Worst
Supreme Court Case Ever?: Naim v. Naim, 12 NEV. L.J. 525 (2012); Marc Spindelman,
Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 446–53 (2001); Gerald Gunther, The
Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1964); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (characterizing Supreme Court’s action in
Naim as based “on procedural grounds that . . . are wholly without basis in the law”).
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that the unconstitutionality of DOMA and other marriage laws
discriminating against same-sex couples was overdetermined.341
IV. CONCLUSION
In neither Hollingsworth v. Perry nor United States v. Windsor
did the Supreme Court make any doctrinal splashes. Perry did extend
Article III standing doctrine to hold that private parties who were not
agents of the state and suffered no nonideological injury of their own
lacked standing to take appeals in federal court to defend state laws
they support, even if they were responsible for qualifying the
initiative that made the law. The Court’s precedent arguably did not
squarely dictate an answer to the question whether or not initiative
sponsors could, without more, be authorized by state law to defend
their measures and thereby enjoy federal court standing.342
Therefore, some extension of doctrine was necessary whatever way
the Court was going to rule. But Perry’s holding will have limited
impact. Windsor did hold a federal statute unconstitutional because it
denied lawfully married same-sex couples equal protection, but it did
not resolve the question of what tier of equal protection scrutiny
applies to sexual orientation discrimination, a basic doctrinal
question that the Court has left open since its first opinion addressing
lesbigay people’s equal protection rights almost two decades earlier
in Romer v. Evans.343 Nor did Windsor reach the question whether
the fundamental constitutional right to marry extends to same-sex
couples. For these reasons, it could appear to be a modest case.
Yet, we should bear in mind Justice Souter’s admonition that
“[n]ot every epochal case has come in epochal trappings.”344 The
Supreme Court’s decisions in the marriage cases of its October 2012
term paved the way for the restoration of same-sex couple’s freedom
341. Accord Larry Tribe, DOMA, Prop 8, and Justice Scalia’s Intemperate Dissent,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/doma-prop-8-and-justice
-scalias-intemperate-dissent/ (concluding that, given Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the
Court’s decision in Windsor “if anything, . . . was over-determined, given the added federalism
spin that propelled it”).
342. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Prop 8 Deserved a Defense, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/28/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-proposition-8-initiatives
-20130628 (opining that Perry standing holding “was clearly right as a matter of constitutional
law”).
343. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
344. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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to marry in the nation’s most populous state, California, home to
almost one in eight people in the United States. Windsor also
certainly contributed to the swelling wave of marriage equality
litigation across the land, something unfolding at a pace almost too
fast to keep up with: at least eighty-five lawsuits have been filed in
thirty-two states and Puerto Rico.345 Though looking increasingly
likely, the advent of nationwide marriage equality might not be as
inevitable as Justice Scalia’s suggestion that “it is just a matter of
listening and waiting”346 for “the second, state-law shoe to be
dropped later, maybe next Term.”347 But with the Windsor and Perry
decisions, in conjunction with the growing support among the
populace for same-sex couples’ right to marry,348 the Supreme Court
has immeasurably helped this particular fight for “Equal Justice
Under Law.”

345. See, e.g., Pending Marriage Equality Cases, Lambda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org
/pending-marriage-equality-cases (last updated Aug. 1, 2014) (“In summary, there currently are
85 pending lawsuits … involving how the marriage laws of 32 states and Puerto Rico apply to
same-sex couples. (The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.) All states that do not
currently allow same-sex couples to marry currently have pending lawsuits challenging that ban,
or the refusal of the state to recognize marriages same-sex couples entered outside the
jurisdiction, or both.”); id. (“Marriage equality now exists in the District of Columbia and the
following 19 states: CA, CT, DE, HI, IA, IL, MA, MD, ME, MN, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OR, PA, RI,
VT and WA.”).
346. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2710 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 2705.
348. See, e.g., Gallup Gay Marriage Poll Finds Majority of U.S. Citizens Would Support
POST
(July 31, 2013),
Nationwide
Marriage
Equality
Law,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/31/gallup-gay-marriage-poll-_n_3682884.html
(describing several nationwide polls showing majority support for same-sex couples’ equal
freedom to marry).

